

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

**Review of the Commonwealth Secretariat's
support to the Iwokrama Programme
Phase 2**

FINAL REPORT

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DISCLAIMER

This report was prepared with financial assistance from the ComSec as part of a technical assistance contract.

The views expressed herein are those of the consultants and do not represent any official view of the ComSec.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

Introduction to the review

The Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) has provided support to the Iwokrama endeavour for about eighteen years. During this time there has not been any formal review by the Secretariat of the effectiveness or the impact of this assistance. The current phase of the Secretariat's funding is due to finish at the end of the 2007/08 financial year. In June 2007, the Management Committee had agreed that a Review be conducted of all assistance provided by the ComSec to the Iwokrama Rain Forest Programme since 1995.

A 40 day field based review was carried out by BioDiversity International Ltd after a short internal desk study known as the Phase 1 review. The review used standard evaluation approaches alongside elements of an organisational development technique for identifying the energy for change amongst stakeholders called Appreciative Inquiry. The general aim of the review is to try to make things better for all parties involved by learning from successes and mistakes. The specific aim is to advise ComSec on a strategy, framework and options for the future.

The Iwokrama endeavour (Project description)

The Iwokrama endeavour is an attempt to learn lessons on how to manage an area of rain forest in a way that benefits the people of the world as well as the people of the country where the forest is located. The stream of benefits should remain for future generations. The endeavour has several recognisable phases with different inputs (funds and staffing) and different outputs (results). It has been funded by many different agencies over the years.

The Langkawi phase represents the period leading up to the 1989 Commonwealth heads of government meeting (CHOGM) in Langkawi Malaysia. This was when Commonwealth countries had environment (especially rain forests) and "sustainable development" uppermost in their minds. This is where the Government of Guyana offered the use of 1 million acres of forest lands as a living laboratory for their citizens, the Commonwealth and the International Community. The review team calls this offer "the Guyana protocol". This phase is very relevant to the work of the review team in terms of understanding what was offered and why and how the Commonwealth heads of government responded. These are vital aspects in understanding the aspirations of design. The Guyana protocol is of pivotal importance today because similar offers are required from other countries if the world is to be equipped to face the challenge of climate change. The most important output here is the 1989 CHOGM minute.

The ComSec was asked to investigate the offer and to make the best use of it. They put together a Commonwealth expert group (CEG) headed by M S Swaminathan, (a very eminent research scientist who also knew about the administration of research institutes) so that a project could be prepared. This was very complicated because legal aspects of the land offer would have to be sorted out along with finding the right

site. They decided that the best way to stabilise the complexity of the design was to embody it in an Act of Parliament. The Act was passed in Guyana in 1995 with the Government and the ComSec as cosignatories. The review team calls this six year phase (1989-95) “A unique and interesting Act” The team could not find any data on the costs of the CEG but a similar project preparation mission today would cost around £250k. Other agencies including DFID funded the geographical work carries out by the UK based Natural Resources Institute. Again no cost data is available but a similar exercise today would cost in excess of £500k. The ComSec played a major overseeing role in delivering the act so it can be viewed as “midwife”. By co-signing the act, it can be viewed as parent. So even though ComSec has only contributed about a quarter (guesstimate) of the total funding of Iwokrama, most of the outputs can be co-attributed to them in that they are jointly responsible for the endeavour attaining its purpose. The two most significant outputs of this phase is the Act. The preparation document (The Swaminathan Report) is also important

The Act specified six outputs in the form of (1) Field site gazetted and baselines characterised, (2) HQ located and equipped (3) Centre with Communication and Information unit sustained (4) International Board of Trustees established (5) Programme developed and (6) Archive developed and maintained as an inviolable resource. It also inferred (7) “Core fund” obtained. A core fund means a guaranteed annual fund for purposes decided by the management. This could be the interest from an invested capital sum or a commitment from a donor or benefactor in perpetuity. It does not mean project funds where the money is tied to an output. The team call the three year period 1995-1998 “the programme years”. This is where many scientists were funded to carry out academic research projects under many broad programmes to do with human development, forestry, and biodiversity. 40% of the ComSec’s project funding for Iwokrama was spent on programmes and 41% on staffing the Centre. The remainder was spent on the site and its baselines. There were probably many other useful outputs produced during this phase, but because no monitoring, evaluation and learning system (MEL) was set up to properly record and characterise them, they remain unknown. Even a full list of high impact publications remains absent to this day.

By 1999, the lack of any core fund meant that when the donors stopped being interested in forest related projects, all support funds dramatically decreased. At this point there were three main options: (1) Close the endeavour and report back to the Commonwealth with findings and a possibly a proposal, (2) Concentrate more resources on obtaining the core fund, and (3) Identify the most financially sustainable and effective part of the endeavour and build on this using advice and other assistance from the private sector. What actually happened was that a group consisting largely of academics and administrators put together what they called a “business plan”. The team call the eight year (1999-2007) phase “Using business to fund research”. 81% of ComSec project funds have been spent during this period, mainly in the form organisational development senior executives at the Centre. 42% of the 81% however was used to fund a forester. The two important (survival) outputs were the “Mentz Plan (1998-2007)” and the “Glover Plan (2006-2010)”

Approach of the review team (Evaluation methodology)

The team used document review in addition to stakeholder workshops and interviews in order to carry out a participatory review. A final stakeholder workshop to discuss findings was not possible for reasons beyond the team's control. In view of this all findings and recommendations should be regarded as preliminary and to be discussed with the Government of Guyana and others. The team used *ex-poste* construction of logical framework elements in order to identify strategic aspects (from the past) along with elements of a technique called Appreciative Inquiry in order to identify the energy for change (participatory construction of the future using the strengths of the present). The team faced three major constraints in carrying out the review; (1) The lack organisational development a MEL system meant that activities rather than outputs have been the main form of reporting. (2) The lack of clear attribution meant that the team were denied access to certain documents due to thoughts that "the work was not 100% funded by ComSec" and (3) An analysis of project design has never been carried out. The team avoided duplication of the work of the multi-donor review team who assessed the period up to 2000 (mainly the programme years) and commented on the implementation plan up to 2002.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Iwokrama has no formal purpose

The 1996 Iwokrama act does not specify a purpose for Iwokrama as a whole, only a purpose for the Act and its components, e.g. the site, the HQ and the centre etc. In order to find the purpose it was essential to find the official minute of the event that gave birth to the endeavour: *"In 1989, Heads of Commonwealth Government's noted with appreciation the generous offer from the President of Guyana to set aside part of its tropical forest for a pilot project under Commonwealth auspices to study utilisation of the forest on a sustainable basis and the conservation of species"*.

In 2007, talks with those who advised the Government of Guyana in 1989, suggested that the project purpose was *"to obtain practical lessons how forest lands could be managed continuously within environmentally vulnerable nations, in a way that contributes to the wellbeing of local communities, and the protection of aspects of biodiversity and environmental services by date X"*.

Recommendation 1: The ComSec should adopt the CHOGM based formulation of project purpose as this is the official foundation document for the Commonwealth. Other review recommendations should be considered in the light of this project purpose.

Many endowed centres for tropical forestry research now exist

There are now many endowed centres such as CATIE and The Smithsonian Tropical Forestry Research Institute now exist now exist. This is in addition to the main multi-donor endowed Centre for International Forestry (CIFOR) set up by the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research. These all have access to forest lands on their doorstep and in other areas and Countries.

Recommendation 2. The ComSec should not fund a duplicate Centre, but should fund a mission to investigate the nature of synergy and "buy in" (What Guyana based services they would pay for) with

current Centres and Panels (IPCC etc) involved in issues connected with forest lands with emphasis on environmental services linked to the challenge of climate change.

Iwokrama has no core fund

Recommendation 3. The ComSec should fund a mission to formulate a plan for raising an endowment fund that includes a plan to set up a Commonwealth lottery for Environment based on the UK model of the UK Heritage Lottery Foundation. This is to be presented at a CHOGM along with a clear proposal for endowment contributions.

Iwokrama has no inviolable archive as stipulated by the Act

Recommendation 4 The ComSec should fund a mission to prepare a proposal for an inviolable web based archive and a book with emphasis on key outputs and lessons learned. This should be linked to the ComSec's own website and benefit from their media and information resources

Iwokrama has no “focussing mechanism” and has spread itself too thinly

Rain forest lands have many ways that they contribute and can potentially contribute to the economy. It could be argued that the one thing that rain forest have in abundance is potential and this is often overwhelming for projects. There are two approaches that the project could have used to give focus so that they could effectively concentrate on the most important results with limited resources. The first would have been to employ an economist with experience of forest lands. This was pointed out by the multi donor mid term review, but alas, has been ignored. The second would have been to have set up a monitoring evaluation and learning system based on a logical framework. This has also not happened. The business plans have continued a “shotgun approach” which is an acknowledged strategy with a high level of staff inputs but is questionable when resources are tight. This review has carried out a rapid participatory analysis of the most effective output and have concluded that knowledge based tourism (KBT) maybe the way to go. Most visitors to Iwokrama have observed that the most successful element in terms of number of benefits appears to be KBT visits to the unique forest lands associated with Iwokrama (forest, waterways, wetlands and unique local culture). Can a model be developed where lessons are adopted (outside Iwokrama) and the Iwokrama forest is protected in perpetuity by a local forest guide entity funded by revenues from KBT?

Recommendation 5. The ComSec should fund a logical framework based project preparation mission for preparing a tender for a concession on lesson transmission and adoption via knowledge based tourism linked to forest guides who can protect the forest. They should consider the ideal nature of the concessionaire entity (Private company/public private partnership/Community based organisation etc)

Iwokrama has no clear impact pathway via the Commonwealth

Recommendation 6. The ComSec should facilitate a Commonwealth working group on forest lands and their continuous contribution to the national economy in the face of the challenge of climate change. This

working group is to be the main recipient and disseminator of Iwokrama findings and recommendations. It could also be given a task of fund raising for Iwokrama and other relevant endeavours

Iwokrama is technically complex in relation to the environmental development potential of forest lands

The review found a number of problems in relation to ComSec involvement at Board level (direction and impact facilitation) and within the HQ (quality checking of outputs in relation to design and implementation)

Recommendation 7 The ComSec should retain the services of a consultant for specialist inputs in relation to advice on efficiency, effectiveness and impact aspects of Iwokrama. This should include quality checking of project outputs, annual project reviews and IBIOT briefing notes

FUTURE OPTIONS

The review found no evidence to suggest that project closure and immediate withdrawal of ComSec assistance was required. However there is a need for the ComSec to decide on the level and duration of their commitment for the future in terms of funding

Recommendation 8 The ComSec should decide on which of the following outputs it will fund. Any non funded outputs should be submitted to the Commonwealth via a relevant CHOGM in order to identify the level of support and any special funds

1. **The Archive**
2. **The retained consultant**
3. **The endowment fund mission**
4. **The institutional buy in mission**
5. **Formulation of a focussed logical framework project based on knowledge based tourism**

OTHER KEY ISSUES

ComSec has not been an effective facilitator of Iwokrama due to organisational not procedural reasons

The terms of reference (Annex One) asks the following questions

1. To what degree has the Commonwealth support for the IIC helped to leverage support for the IIC from other sources? How significant is Commonwealth support in comparison to other sources of support?
2. To what extent has the Secretariat's programme of assistance to Iwokrama achieved its intended results? How effectively and efficiently have the intended results been achieved by the Secretariat?
3. What has been the impact of Commonwealth assistance to the IIC on local communities? How has the

ComSec contributed to gender equality?

4. To what extent has the Secretariat followed project management procedures in executing its programme of assistance and how much collaboration was evident internally and externally with partners in the delivery of the assistance? What constraints, if any, has the Secretariat encountered in the execution of its assistance and could these have been avoided?
5. How effectively has the Secretariat participated in Iwokrama's governance structure?

The overall conclusion is that ComSec has not followed recognised donor project management procedures in that it did not request a logical framework for the endeavour from the Commonwealth expert group in 1989 or ever since. There has been no formally agreed impact pathway (local or overall), plan for sustainability, gender guidelines or effective "steering" of the project at board level. ComSec has given credibility to the endeavour so that funds could be raised from other donors or agencies, but leverage in the form of strategic co-funding has not been achieved. The serious deficiencies in ComSec project management extend to failing to stipulate a robust (output as opposed to category based) financial planning and management system from the implementing team. This has led to a number of financial crises and the provision of "emergency funds". The lack of effective technical guidance (steering) and the availability of input as opposed to output link funds have given rise to some members of IBOT seeing ComSec merely as the "banker of last resort". Given the depth of the serious deficiencies, the review team concludes that training on project management procedures alone is not enough. ComSec is required by the Commonwealth to be an "informed facilitator" at both political and technical levels. If this review of Iwokrama is representative of a typical ComSec technical endeavour, then it is clear that ComSec does not have the human resources framework to be a "learning organisation". This is a pre-requisite for any facilitating organisation.

Recommendation 9 The ComSec should decide on whether it seeks to become an organisation that learns in order to be a more effective agency in the delivery of technical cooperation, and if so should contract an external consultant in organisational development in order to develop an appropriate human resources framework based upon Appreciative Inquiry.

Recommendation 10. Rapid facilitation of learning in relation to environmental development across Commonwealth countries should be carried out by establishing a Commonwealth award and medal scheme. External consultants could be used to develop a consultative proposal on this

Recommendation 11 The ComSec should obtain advice on their efficacy of the Guyana protocol of "making lands for Commonwealth purposes" being expanded in Guyana and duplicated across the Commonwealth as a network for learning on profitable solutions to the challenge of climate change. ComSec could start by investigating the outcome of recent offers made to the UK Government by the president of Guyana and in particular investigate if Iwokrama would be a good test case (due to richness of baselines) of a practical and broadly acceptable approach to the Reduction of Emissions through Deforestation and Degradation proposals

1.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE REVIEW

1.1 Background to the review

The Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) has provided support to the Iwokrama endeavour for about eighteen years. During this time there has not been any formal review by the Secretariat of the effectiveness or the impact of this assistance. The current phase of the Secretariat's funding is due to finish at the end of the 2007/08 financial year. In June 2007, the Management Committee had agreed that a review be conducted of all assistance provided by the ComSec to the Iwokrama Rain Forest Programme since 1995.

A preliminary desk study was undertaken in the UK (Phase I) which involved a review of the programme files and other documents as well as consultations with ComSec staff. The desk study documents the history and nature of the support provided by the Secretariat to the programme during the period 1995 – 2007, the monitoring and review systems used by the Secretariat and the governance structure for the programme. Phase 1 also included an examination and analysis of ComSec funding for the programme including documentation of expenditure and an assessment of the financial arrangements in place for effective oversight and accountability.

Phase 2 of the review extends this work through a participatory approach with stakeholders and key informants. It involved field visits, questionnaires, and the use of elements of appreciative inquiry and logical framework analysis.

1.2 Terms of Reference and key deliverables

The terms of reference for the review are listed in Annex One.

Annex Two shows the itinerary for the 40 day input as split between the team leader forest conservation specialist (Prof Newman) and the social development specialist (Dr Malleson).

The initial 40 day period was extended to a total of 50 days in order to allow more detailed analysis of selected issues and to produce outputs appended in the following annexes:

- Technical lessons on forest biodiversity. Annex Three
- Job Profile and Terms of Reference for an executive chair. Annex Four
- Pros and Cons of a “Government Free Zone”. Annex Five
- Concept note on forest lands and zones of influence. Annex Six
- Concept note on ideal partnership structures for forest stewardship. Annex Seven

The key deliverables include a review of the work plan, first draft of review report, seminar and presentation on findings and a final review report

1.3 The scope of the review

BioDiversity International Ltd has been involved in many reviews and evaluations and has been made aware of the importance of relevance and design, in the success of development activities.

The scope of the review has been extended by agreement on the basis of an accepted case. This has had the effect that the preliminary work prior to 1996 is now included.

Many crucial aspects of the Iwokrama endeavour are outlined in the 1996 Act. This shows that Iwokrama has two “parents”. The Government of Guyana and the ComSec. Both parties should be acknowledged and consulted in terms of success and following up new opportunities and lessons learned.

1.4 The emphasis of the review

The emphasis of the review is to provide a simple direction as part of a strategic framework to be used by the ComSec, and possibly others, to develop options for the future.

The recommendations will also be of a form different to normal evaluations in that the recipients are either the ComSec or the ComSec in association with the Government of Guyana. Recommendations to project executives and others are specifically excluded.

1.5 The format of the report

In most cases the evidence for the findings will be clear from headings and sub headings. Numbered recommendations are presented adjacent to relevant findings.

Annex eight indicates documents consulted and some of those that are missing

Annex Nine contains an analysis of ComSec project documents

The evaluation devices of “missing outputs” and “unexpected outputs” are used to stress the differences between design and implementation.

1.6 The Phase One Review

The Phase One review of Iwokrama (carried out internally) by the ComSec had no positive comments and found a number of serious issues including:

- Funding, financing and cash flow problems
- Little outside awareness (visibility) and poor brand image
- Discord between the Chair of the Board, other trustees and the Director General (DG)
- Confusion on the best location for the endeavour within the Secretariat
- Inappropriate business agreements and conflicts of interest
- Limited representation of local communities and the youth and confusion surrounding the business plan

The severity of these findings pointed to serious problems with aspects of design and implementation. It was clear that the current strategy of support offered by the ComSec is not desirable.

1.7 Mobilisation of the Review team

Despite the best endeavours of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (and to some extent the timing of the mission) a stakeholder workshop could not be organised at which preliminary findings could be discussed. Also a meeting with the President or his advisors (of central importance to Iwokrama) could not be accomplished.

It is essential that the findings, framework and options be seen as preliminary and for further examination by the ComSec in consultation with the Government of Guyana. The attribution issue

2.0 THE IWOKRAMA ENDEAVOUR (PROJECT DESCRIPTION)

2.1 Phases of the endeavour

The Iwokrama endeavour is an attempt to learn lessons on how to manage an area of rain forest in a way that benefits the people (in mainly socio-economic terms) of the world as well as the people of the country where the forest is located. The stream of benefits should remain for future generations. The endeavour has several recognisable phases with different inputs (funds and staffing) and different outputs (results). It has been funded by many different agencies over the years.

The “Langkawi phase” represents the period leading up to the 1989 Commonwealth heads of government meeting (CHOGM) in Langkawi Malaysia. This was when Commonwealth countries had environment (especially rain forests) and “sustainable development” uppermost in their minds. This is where the Government of Guyana offered the use of 1 million acres of forest lands as a living laboratory for their citizens, the Commonwealth and the International Community. The review team calls this offer “the Guyana protocol”. This phase is very relevant to the work of the review team in terms of understanding what was offered and why and how the Commonwealth heads of government responded. These are vital aspects in understanding the aspirations of design. The Guyana protocol is of pivotal importance today because similar offers are required from other countries if the world is to be equipped to face the challenge of climate change. The most important output here is the 1989 CHOGM minute.

The ComSec was asked to investigate the offer and to make the best use of it. They put together a Commonwealth expert group (CEG) headed by M S Swaminathan, (a very eminent research scientist who also knew about the administration of research institutes) so that a project could be prepared. This was very complicated because legal aspects of the land offer would have to be sorted out along with finding the right site. They decided that the best way to stabilise the complexity of the design was to embody it in an Act of Parliament. The Act was passed in

Guyana in 1995 with the Government and the ComSec as co-signatories. The review team calls this six year phase (1989-95) “A unique and interesting Act” The team could not find any data on the costs of the CEG, but a similar project preparation mission today would cost around £250k. Other agencies including DFID funded the geographical work carries out by the UK based Natural Resources Institute. Again no cost data is available but a similar exercise today would cost in excess of £500k. The ComSec played a major overseeing role in delivering the act so it can be viewed as “midwife”. By co-signing the act, it can be viewed as “parent”. So even though ComSec has only contributed about a quarter (guesstimate) of the total funding of Iwokrama, most of the outputs can be co-attributed to them in that they are jointly responsible for the endeavour attaining its purpose. The two most significant outputs of this phase are the Act and the preparation document (The Swaminathan Report).

The Act specified six outputs in the form of (1) Field site gazetted and baselines characterised, (2) HQ located and equipped (3) Centre with Communication and Information unit sustained (4) International Board of Trustees established (5) Programme developed and (6) Archive developed and maintained as an inviolable resource. It also inferred (7) “Core fund” obtained. A core fund means a guaranteed annual fund for purposes decided by the management. This could be the interest from an invested capital sum or a commitment from a donor or benefactor in perpetuity. It does not mean project funds where the money is tied to an output. The team call the three year period 1995-1998 “the programme years”. This is where many scientists were funded to carry out academic research projects under many broad programmes to do with human development, forestry, and biodiversity. 40% of the ComSec’s project funding for Iwokrama was spent on programmes and 41% on staffing the Centre. The remainder was spent on the site and its baselines. There were probably many other useful outputs produced during this phase, but because no monitoring, evaluation and learning system (MEL) was set up to properly record and characterise them, they remain unknown. Even a full list of high impact publications remains absent to this day.

By 1999, the lack of any core fund meant that when the donors stopped being interested in forest related projects, all support funds dramatically decreased. At this point there were three main options: (1) Close the endeavour and report back to the Commonwealth with findings and a possibly a proposal, (2) Concentrate more resources on obtaining the core fund, and (3) Identify the most financially sustainable and effective part of the endeavour and build on this using advice and other assistance from the private sector. What actually happened was that a group consisting largely of academics and administrators put together what they called a “business plan”. The team call the eight year (1999-2007) phase “Using business to fund research”. 81% of ComSec project funds have been spent during this period, mainly in the form of senior executives at the Centre. 42% of the 81% however was used to fund a forester. The two important (survival) outputs were the “Mentz Plan (1998-2007)” and the “Glover Plan (2006-2010)”

2.2 Stakeholders

For the purpose of the review, it is convenient to identify key stakeholders including:

- The Commonwealth
- The Government of Guyana
- The ComSec
- Government members of the International Board of trustees (IBOT)
- The Amerindian member of IBOT (Position only available since 2002)
- Other IBOT members
- Executive staff and support staff
- Other IBOT members
- Citizens of Guyana
- Friends of Iwokrama

2.3 The current state of affairs

The review team found considerable energy for change within the various groups:

- The Commonwealth (2007 CHOGM) has “reaffirmed its continued commitment to the 1989 Langkawi Declaration on the Environment” shown “support for improved land management. Including conservation and sustainable use of forest resources” and “renewed its commitment to the Iwokrama rain forest programme at the Lake Victoria CHOGM held in 2007”. It has also issued a directive to the ComSec for more effort in relation to increasing international awareness and support.
- The Government of Guyana and its IBOT representatives are keen for increased international support.
- The ComSec is keen to establish the relevance and potential linkages of the endeavour to the challenge of climate change with special reference to the Commonwealth.
- The Amerindian representative is keen to harness local solutions with emphasis on the youth and is now empowered by the creation of a “district council”.
- Other IBOT members are keen to balance the books and realign the programme with emphasis on convincing “hard nosed” backers and capitalising on the special potential of tourism.
- The executives are keen to facilitate the effective hosting of the work of others.

- The citizens of Guyana are keen to hear how Iwokrama can contribute to the National Economy and Society and The Friends of Iwokrama have offered both financial and other forms of support.

3.0 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

3.1 General

The team used document review in addition to stakeholder workshops and interviews in order to carry out a participatory review. A final stakeholder workshop to discuss findings was not possible for reasons beyond the team's control. In view of this all findings and recommendations should be regarded as preliminary and to be discussed with the Government of Guyana and others. The team used *ex-poste* construction of logical framework elements in order to identify strategic aspects (from the past) along with elements of a technique called Appreciative Inquiry in order to identify the energy for change (participatory construction of the future using the strengths of the present). The team faced three major constraints in carrying out the review; (1) The lack of a MEL system meant that activities rather than outputs have been the main form of reporting. (2) The lack of clear attribution meant that the team were denied access to certain documents due to thoughts that "the work was not 100% funded by ComSec" and (3) An analysis of project design has never been carried out. The team avoided duplication of the work of the multi-donor review team who assessed the period up to 2000 (mainly the programme years) and commented on the implementation plan up to 2002.

3.2 The spirit of the review

In common with all good evaluations, the spirit of the review is to make things better for all concerned by discussing lessons learned from the past and opportunities for the future.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs played an excellent role of helping to identify key stakeholders, organise meetings and interviews and providing valuable guidance at all stages of the field work.

The Government of Guyana is seen as a recipient for the findings of this review

3.3 Quality assessment

It is important to assess the quality of outputs in relation to the evaluation team's experience of similar actions elsewhere. It is also important to suggest the urgency of any action. Findings are therefore expressed using the following terms:

Serious deficiencies: Situation where it would be appropriate to take urgent corrective action.

Problems: Situation can be improved with appropriate action.

Good: The expected standard.

Excellent: Far better than expected.

World Class: Outstanding contribution.

These assessments relate to the situation at the time of the review. Both problems and serious deficiencies point to mistakes and making mistakes is a vital part of learning, and the eventual improvement of any endeavour.

3.4 Terminology

The report format uses evaluation terminology, which can be confusing, as words in common English usage are used in a special way to mean very precise things. These words are briefly explained here. Impact means spread to other areas for instance if a lesson learned in North Rupunnuni spreads to another district or country. Goal recognises that other people in other areas are working on a similar vision and that the project may contribute to this. Purpose means where the project wants to be at the end of its allotted time. Effectiveness comments on those outputs needed or not needed to achieve the purpose. Efficiency refers to how well the team uses time and money to produce outputs. An output is an entity or state of affairs that must be obtained if the project purpose is to be achieved.

3.5 Appreciative Inquiry

The main consequences of this on the review was to increase the need for locating the “energy for change” within various factions using aspects of a technique called appreciative inquiry and using a high level of facilitation and arbitration skills at key meetings. Appreciative inquiry was designed in the United States by David Cooperrider and is a group process that inquires into, identifies and further develops the best of “what is” in organisations in order to create a better future. Often used in the organisational development field as an approach to large scale change, it is a means for addressing issues, challenges, changes, and concerns of an organisation in ways that build on the successful, effective, and energising experiences of its members. Underlying the approach is the belief that the questions we ask are critical to the world we create. In so doing “organisations move towards what they study”

3.6 Project purpose, Goal and outputs

The normal place to find a *purpose* for a development endeavour is the project document or financing agreement. In Iwokrama the foundation document is known as the Iwokrama Act 1996.

The Act does indeed give a *purpose* for the Act, and some outputs, namely, a site, a physical HQ, a centre, and a programme. **However it does not give a purpose for the whole endeavour.**

In order to find this purpose it is essential to investigate the period before 1996.

In the late 1970s, and throughout the 1980’s there was great concern about unsustainable development. Forests were a key theme and there was a cry from the richer countries of the North to protect the forests of the poorer countries of the South.

Interviews with two important Government of Guyana advisors, active during the late 1980's, namely Rashleigh Jackson and Lance Carberry, gave rise to the following elements of intervention logic:

- *Guyana, like many other poor countries, does not have the funds to protect forests adequately.*
- *Forest lands (the national estate which may or may not contain large trees) are an important resource that could and do contribute to the economy. By locking them up (preserving them), this could/would result in income foregone.*
- *The wealth of many rich countries has, in part, been as a result of the liquidation of their forest asset.*
- *In addition, Guyana in common with many other poor countries is vulnerable in that it suffers from a brain drain and corruption in certain quarters.*
- *Therefore we need to ask the rich countries of the North to put their money (and expertise) where their mouth is.*
- *We could give provide access to an area of forest lands, where the international community could come and assist in order to demonstrate practical lessons on how income could be derived from those lands without adversely affecting local communities and key specific aspects of biodiversity and environmental services.*

1989 was a key year for forests. It was the year that the UK's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, announced £100m in aid for projects in tropical forests. It was also a pivotal year in relation to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

In 1989, the CHOGM was held at Langkawi, Malaysia and the **official minutes** are taken from key sections of the Communiqué, known as the Langkawi declaration on environment:

Page 3 section 3 "The main environmental problems facing the world are the greenhouse effectsome islands and low lying areas of other countries are threatened by the prospect of rising sea levels."

Page 4. "Many environmental problems transcend national boundaries and interests necessitating a co-ordinated global effort"

Page 6. "To achieve sustainable development, economic growth is a compelling necessity. Sustainable development implies the incorporation of environmental concerns into economic planning and policies..."

Page 34. Section 92... "They asked the SG to identify a group of experts on the environment who could monitor and evaluate developments concerning climate change, taking account of the work

of the IPCC, and deal with other environmental issues as needs arise.”

Section 93. “Heads of government noted with appreciation the generous offer from the President of Guyana to set aside part of Guyana’s Amazonian tropical forest for a pilot project under commonwealth auspices to study utilisation of the forest on a sustainable basis and the conservation of species. They asked the SG to organise a high level exploratory mission to pursue the offer with the Guyanese authorities”.

On the basis of the above it appears that the project purpose for Iwokrama was

“to obtain practical lessons how forest lands could be managed continuously within environmentally vulnerable nations, in a way that contributes to the wellbeing of local communities, and the protection of aspects of biodiversity and environmental services by date X”.

Recommendation 1: The ComSec should adopt the CHOGM based formulation of project purpose as this is the official foundation document for the Commonwealth. Other review recommendations should be considered in the light of this project purpose.

A general definition of a project is a planned undertaking designed to achieve specific objectives within a specified period of time. A pilot project is one in which learning lessons is the guiding theme.

The term forest lands, refers to National lands designated (gazetted) as forest. In many countries this land has areas with and without trees.

The term continuously refers to activities that do not give rise to a financial burden for environmentally vulnerable nations.

The quality of any purpose achieved could be measured by the number of lessons learned. This is objective and could be verified by any observer not connected with the project. This is called the objectively verifiable indicator (OVI) for the project purpose.

In the 1980s, most of the donor governments, multilateral agencies, and NGOs had projects on the sustainable development of forest lands. So the Government of Guyana, along with the above, could be seen to be contributing to the same Goal to some extent.

The goal that the Iwokrama project would contribute to could be approximated to:

Governments and civil society adopt (at least n) procedures and practices that serve to protect forest lands continuously in a way that contributes to the wellbeing of local communities, and the protection of aspects of biodiversity and environmental services by date X

The OVI is the number of lessons, but in this case it is those “adopted”. For instance if the Iwokrama project came up with the idea that a special design of fence is required to stop domestic

grazing animals from damaging the forest. Then if the project saw the Government of New Zealand using Iwokrama fences, they could say that the government had adopted a lesson learned from the Iwokrama project.

In evaluation terms, a project is said to have made an impact, when it contributes to a formulated goal. The ComSec sometimes calls this “overall impact”.

In evaluation terms, an output is an entity or state of affairs that must be obtained if the project purpose is to be achieved. The act contains seven outputs, but the Act itself was considered to be an essential output, so the number of outputs was eight

- 1) One Act produced
- 2) Field site gazetted and baselines characterised
- 3) HQ located and equipped
- 4) Centre with Communication and Information unit sustained
- 5) International Board of Trustees established
- 6) Programme developed
- 7) Archive developed and maintained as an inviolable resource
- 8) “Core fund” obtained

3.7 ComSec and attribution within Iwokrama

Analysis by the evaluation team led to the following findings in relation to ComSec:

- As the agency that mobilised a Commonwealth expert group to develop an offer made at a Commonwealth heads of government meeting (CHOGM), the ComSec is responsible for design
- As co-signatory of the act, the ComSec is jointly responsible for checking that the endeavour is carried out in accordance with the articles and that steps are taken to obtain the specified outputs (deliverables) of the act.
- With two seats available on the IBOT, the ComSec is jointly responsible for checking that the endeavour follows appropriate procedures, is made aware of Commonwealth linked opportunities and does not compromise the reputation of the ComSec or the Commonwealth.
- By funding and co-signing PAFS, the ComSec is jointly responsible for ensuring that the endeavour achieves the stated “project purpose” and “outputs” only. Unexpected outputs are not attributable to the ComSec
- By funding and co-signing PAFS where key executives are employed, the ComSec is jointly responsible for ensuring that the endeavour achieves the stated “project purpose” and “outputs” and that the staff employed are able to deliver other outputs and procedures

normally expected from professionals employed in that role.

- The above “duty of care” extends to checking that ComSec funded staff are qualified, are not given impossible job descriptions and have access to appropriate tools and procedures.

3.8 The roles of the ComSec

The ComSec has three roles that can be inferred from the Act:

- Role 1: To improve impact by facilitating mutual learning between project and Guyana and between the project and the international community.
- Role 2 To facilitate effectiveness by guiding the production of relevant outputs so that the project purpose is achieved
- Role 3: To facilitate efficiency so that outputs can be achieved with minimal cost and effort

These roles can be carried out by ComSec staff directly or by delegation to consultants, companies or Commonwealth organisations. Role 2 can be described as a steering role and may be difficult for a ComSec project officer to achieve alone. Most donor funded projects have a steering committee which responds to recommendations on this. Iwokrama does not have a steering committee. It has an International board of trustees (IBOT)

4.0 RELEVANCE

4.1 Relevance to the Commonwealth

The relevance of aspects of the Iwokrama endeavour to CHOGs is of higher relevance now than it was in 1989 because it is now recognised that forest lands have a pivotal role in facing the climate change challenge. The conversion of forests by injudicious agricultural practice can give rise to greenhouse gases and the judicious restoration of forests could have a positive effect.

The relevance of aspects of the Iwokrama endeavour to Commonwealth citizens is of higher importance now than it was in 1989 because, there is generally a loss of faith in UN institutions and actions to combat the loss of forests of high biodiversity value and to adapt to the challenge of climate change. Commonwealth citizens now look to CHOGs to facilitate a better UN or to agree on parallel actions.

The relevance of forest lands to climate change and the importance of Iwokrama is now supported by the Lake Victoria Climate Change Action Plan which is part of the Communiqué of the 2007 CHOGM. The most relevant section to Iwokrama is section 12 part (II) which states:

“Support for improved land management, including conservation and sustainable use of forest resources. This should comprise market-based mechanisms and compensatory measures for the preservation of standing forests; provisions for reforestation and afforestation; and measures to

combat illegal logging and other causes of deforestation. **In this regard, the Commonwealth’s commitment to the Iwokrama rain forest programme is renewed and efforts should continue to be pursued to widen international knowledge and support of it.”**

Unfortunately targets are not set and there are no clear working groups delineated.

4.2 Relevance to the Commonwealth countries

There is considerable variation between Commonwealth countries in the extent of their forest lands. For example in the UK it is probably less than 5%. In Guyana it is over 70%. This means that Iwokrama may not be of equal interest to all Commonwealth countries

4.3 The nature of the ComSec staff assistance to Iwokrama

ComSec assistance to Iwokrama programme takes three forms: the provision of IBOT members, the provision of at least one ComSec staff member as a “project officer” and the provision of specified “project” funds and inputs.

The ComSec has two positions available on the IBOT but has only ever taken up one position in the form of the deputy chair, normally taken up by a DSG. The position has no terms of reference and the line management relationship of the chair to ComSec is not clear.

A project officer is allocated from what is considered to be a relevant department. The justification for a department or officer is never given, and there are no terms of reference. The officer responds to matters arising from an Iwokrama executive, (normally a DG) but has no clear line management relationship or responsibility to that executive. There is also no clear line management relationship between the officer and the chair of IBOT

4.4 The nature of the ComSec financial assistance to Iwokrama

Requests for financial assistance appear via various routes and can be discussed at an IBOT meeting; the ComSec then appears to design a “project” around them. Funding is authorised via the production and co-signing of a Project Authorisation Form (PAF). This form, along with notes and reports, are contained in a Project Document (PD).

The Project Management Manual (PMM) 2000 described the ideal state of affairs in terms of process and outcomes that could lead to a results oriented approach within a project cycle based on an initial problem analysis.

It shows that support for Iwokrama is unusual in that the ComSec normally only supports small projects.

Annex 9 shows the list of “projects” funded under the umbrella of Iwokrama. This shows that ComSec assistance has no single purpose or goal and that the funding is reactive and piecemeal rather than as a proactive parent. Much of the funding is for inputs such as staff positions rather than for clearly defined and measurable outputs. In conclusion there is no overall design for

ComSec financial assistance. This has given rise to confusion at many levels. On the one hand, the ComSec project officer may think that Iwokrama is parallel funded with a clear sub project to be attributed to itself. On the other hand Iwokrama staff and some IBOT members may see a contribution to the “pot of funds” i.e. joint funding and in the extreme see ComSec as the “banker of last resort”

The nature of funding to Iwokrama has changed over the years. The table in Annex 9 shows that total funding to Iwokrama was £1,370,001. Further analysis shows that if ComSec travel funds are removed the total is £978,283. 81% of funding (£796,793) was provided after 1999 and was for key programme executives (salaries etc). Prior to this, it was for consultant inputs to characterise the land (baselines and approaches). The table also shows that 42% of the funding (£332,222) for programme executives was for the position of forester. The rest being for DGs and other supporting executives to assist with programme management and direction.

In relation to the eight Iwokrama outputs, analysis shows the ComSec project funding has been:

- Act (no data but thought to be high)
- Land with monitoring and management baseline data (19%).
- Physical HQ (0%)
- Centre (41%)
- International board established (no data)
- Programme (40%)
- Archive (0%)
- Fund (0%)

5.0 DESIGN

5.1 Introduction

Analysis of hundreds of donor funded projects in many countries and sectors by BioDiversity International Ltd has shown that most projects fail to fully achieve their purpose and potential because of poor design and that the reason for this is that, most project and donor organisation staff do not “feel empowered” to change design (for a variety of reasons). Given the complexity of development activities carried out by a diverse set of people from diverse backgrounds it is vital that a design is clear, realistic and coherent.

5.2 Serious deficiencies in clarity

In an ideal world, a simple project document of two pages would describe the purpose of the project, how it contributes to other similar endeavours (overall goal) and what results are required

to achieve the purpose over a given period. It would also outline the synergy and roles of any project partners. The document should be linked to a logical framework that shows the assumptions behind how the project once completed will contribute (impact pathway) and under what conditions the results will lead to the purpose being achieved. The document should also refer to a previous problem analysis or appraisal.

The 1996 Act as an embodiment of design is extremely complex and runs to some 45 pages. It has been mentioned before that it has no clear purpose. Whilst it may have been important to mark the delineation of rights to a piece of land for international use by Act of Parliament, it is difficult to understand why aspects of a centre, programme and governance are required as part of an unwieldy Act.

There is also a lack of clarity on whom or what provides direction? Is it the Centre or is it the IBOT? Article 12(a) states that it is the board that decides policies and priorities. The term Director General implies that this should be the source of direction and not the board.

In summary the review team strongly believes that

It would have been clearer to restrict the role of IIC to protecting the interests of shareholders and identification of policy and funding opportunities only. It should have no role in direction or management.

It would have been clearer to restrict the role of non-salaried chair should to the maintenance of order and process at meetings only. The job description for the chair should therefore contain details of diplomacy, reporting, line management, term and succession planning

The “administrative, almost servile” type duties (Article 16 part 5) and position of “Director General” should have been replaced by a briefly described director post, designed to attract visionary directors. It should be stated that an internationally attractive package would be required to attract candidates of the appropriate stature.

In summary, it would be clearer and simpler if the DG as chief executive “directed” and the ICC “endorses and facilitates their plans”.

5.3 Serious deficiencies in Realism

Given that it was known in 1990 that the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was to set up a fully endowed (donor funded) international centre for forestry research, (to be called CIFOR) it appears to be totally unrealistic to set up a duplicate centre with no donor commitments to contribute an endowment who’s interest could be use to build and run a new centre. Donors do not like duplicate initiatives.

There are now many endowed centres of tropical forestry research, along with an International Panel on climate change that considers forestry aspects.

Recommendation 2. The ComSec should not fund a duplicate Centre, but should fund a mission to investigate the nature of synergy and “buy in” (What Guyana based services they would pay for) with current Centres and Panels (IPCC etc) involved in issues connected with forest lands with emphasis on environmental services linked to the challenge of climate change.

The Act is like “a financing agreement without finance”.

Recommendation 3. The ComSec should fund a mission to formulate a plan for raising an endowment fund that includes a plan to set up a Commonwealth lottery for Environment based on the UK model of the UK Heritage Lottery Foundation. This should be presented at a CHOGM along with a clear proposal for endowment contributions.

The fact that Iwokrama had its own land does not make the Centre unique. All researchers make arrangements to use aspects of existing systems for specific research plans. They do not need everything in the same place in order to publish findings. A Centre in itself is not a suitable purpose for a development endeavour. It must be for something.

5.4 Serious deficiencies in Coherence

A key idea behind Iwokrama is one of demonstrating or influencing others based upon experience. The question therefore arises: Is it coherent to try to do this based upon one site in Guyana or is it more coherent to have a network of sites designed to be representative of the issue in question.

5.5 Problems in the Act

There are many problems in the Act. Key findings are listed overleaf:

- The act should have quoted the 1989 CHOGM Communiqué as the foundation document for Iwokrama.
- The time bound purpose of Iwokrama should have been formulated, along with phases e.g. inception, systems testing, and handover/exit.
- The beneficiaries should have been clearly described and the mechanisms by which they might benefit from forest lands spelt out.
- The impact pathway for the practical results generated should have been outlined along with facilitation responsibilities.
- Iwokrama’s synergy with the Government of Guyana, Commonwealth, ComSec, other commonwealth institutions and commonwealth civil society should have been clearly spelt out.
- The intervention logic should be clear and realistic and should refer to a logical framework as

an annex so that assumptions and indicators can be updated. Wherever possible *outputs* should have been converted to results in relation to behavioural change, with clear targets.

- An indicative component budget (land, HQ, Centre, Programme etc.) should have been produced along with clear responsibilities for obtaining the funds as one off payments or investments for a trust fund outlined. The cost of the governing structure (£100k per annum?) along with all committees etc. should also have been budgeted in order that realism be assessed.
- The loose term of “communication and information unit” (Article 13) should have been replaced by a clearly defined monitoring, evaluation and learning unit (Decision support system) linked to programme planning and reporting systems. The unit should be responsible for a rolling monitoring and evaluation plan.
- The need for inception, quarterly and annual reporting should have been clearly spelt out along with the need and protocols for annual and overall (>3yr) work planning.

5.6 Positive aspects

The only world class aspect of the Act was the encapsulation of what the review team has come to call the “Guyana Protocol” (Annex Five). This is the idea of setting up a government free zone in which international action research could be nurtured. A government free zone is also attractive to foreign investment, thus dramatically increasing the power and relevance of the action research.

Excellent aspects of the Act include:

- A clause 31 that allows revision of the Act without recourse to Parliament. An IBOT minute signed off by the President of Guyana and ComSec Secretary General is all that is required.
- The lists of desired activities and or features which includes a final phrase “other things thought necessary”, also gives the opportunity for flexibility.
- Article 15 gives the IBOT powers to delegate
- The IBOT also have a relatively free hand to grant concessions, joint ventures and licenses etc.
- The IBOT can appoint and mobilise independent reviews (Article 12h).

Good aspects of the Act include:

- It is stated that “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prejudice, alter or affect any right or privilege heretofore legally or traditionally possessed, exercised or enjoyed by any Amerindian who has a particular connection with any area of land within or neighbouring the Programme Site”
- It would “endeavour to preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices protocol

of indigenous communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable utilisation of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices; and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge, innovations and practice”

- The IBOT would be advised by an “Advisory Panel on Sustainable Human Development” that “shall tender advice on issues relating to Amerindian welfare, environment, equity, employment, and advancement of women, as related to the work of the Centre. The members of the Panel shall include media experts, environmentalists, social scientists, human (*sic*) anthropologists, ecologists and representatives of women’s and Amerindian organisations”.
- At least one Amerindian representative on the IBOT
- An inviolable archive.
- The idea of a zone split into a wilderness preserve and a sustainable utilisation area.

6.0 EFFICIENCY

6.1 Introduction

Efficiency refers to the way activities and or funds have been used to obtain outputs, including comments on the quality of the output. The section covers outputs and benefits (if present) of ComSec support at all of the phases of the development of Iwokrama. Comments are listed under each of the eight outputs below.

6.2 One Act produced

Many of the documents produced between the 1989 CHOGM announcement and the 1996 Act were not available to the review team. The current Iwokrama information officer stated that “many documents were lost or damaged in a flood and many were not moved to new premises”. The most important document is known as the “Swaminathan report” of August 1990. Part one is known as the report of the commonwealth group of experts. Part 2 is known as the site description report by the Guyana Inter Agency Committee. Part two was the pre-cursor of the NRI main report on the Phase one site survey 1993 by Hawkes M D and Wall J R D. These volumes exist in the ComSec archive as hard copies only.

The Act took up to seven years to be produced. Given the political complexity in Guyana at the time, and the technical complexity of the endeavour, the timeliness could be described as good. The quality of the Act can also be described as good. Given the absence of cost data, little can be said about financial efficiency.

It should be noted that any analysis of technical efficiency, should take note of the political

complexity of what was to be achieved. Between 1989 and 1996, Guyana had aspects of a command economy, being derived from earlier experience of Marxist-Leninist principles. The idea of setting aside one million acres to outside interests, under the management and direction of foreign experts, would not have been easy to bring about. What might now be thought of as unwieldy, was probably, politically expedient at that time.

Perhaps the most testing question is: Did the Act deliver what was requested at the 1989 CHOGM? This was to “set aside part of Guyana’s Amazonian tropical forest for a *pilot project* under commonwealth auspices to study utilisation of the forest on a sustainable basis and the conservation of species”. The answer is; it delivered “the gazetted land” but failed to deliver a pilot project. For a pilot project, a clear, simple and time bound project *purpose* is required. The Act did not contain this.

Given the flexibility of the Act and especially Clause 31, there are no “Serious deficiencies” where it would be appropriate to take urgent corrective action by redrafting the Act.

The review team found that the following ComSec outputs had problems:

- The ComSec did not have the appropriate expertise to mobilise a Commonwealth Expert Group as evidenced by the Act as the *output*. The request at the 1989 CHOGM was for a “macro” socioeconomic framework approach for assessing contributions of forest lands to economies in a manner cognisant of sustainable development. A macro-economist should have been selected as DG. (The resulting product would have been very different in terms of clarity, realism and scale.)
- The ComSec did not have appropriate expertise to check the Act, whilst in draft form.

6.3 Field site gazetted and baselines characterised

It should be noted that the protection of the field site (Sovereign land) remains the sole responsibility of the Government of Guyana.

At first glance this output does not look like it should be attributed to the ComSec. This is because much of the pre 1998 work was funded by other donors. However closer examination points to the ComSec being centrally involved due to:

- The output in a sense is never finished, as a baseline is a function of a particular research activity. The Fairview Concession is a new (post 1999) gazetted third zone.
- The work of the current forest manager, Ken Rodway, has updated the forest management plan with emphasis on the sustainable utilisation area. This has included inventory work and prescriptions based on low impact logging as defined by the certification process overseen by the Forest Stewardship Council.

Financial efficiency cannot be analysed due to the lack of cost data.

The quality of the work is generally excellent and it has been carried out in a timely and technically competent manner, apart from the archiving aspects (see section 6.6).

The lack of data on the minimum costs for forest protection remains absent after 18 years and can be viewed as a serious deficiency. The ComSec did not specify this as an output in relation to the work of Ken Rodway.

The lack of a clearly defined “zone of influence” (Annex 6) is a problem. This is not the same as a buffer zone, often set as an area bound by a fixed distance from the edge of a special core zone. An economist might describe a zone of influence, depending on the mechanism of economic advantage e.g. hydroelectricity. A climate scientist might define it by the zone of influence in terms of atmospheric chemistry or physics.

6.4 HQ located and equipped on land owned by the University of Guyana

This output has not been produced, as defined in the Act. An HQ was not built on land owned by the University of Guyana. The HQ rented existing office space

Links with the University have been intermittent and varied over the years and included the involvement of academic staff in the programme and equipping University laboratories to serve the programme. The current relationship is not strong and there is little synergy.

The programme currently operates between two “headquarters” An expensive administrative office (rented detached building on its own plot) in Georgetown and the Field station next to the forest.

The programme accounts are not sufficiently detailed to allow functional analysis of financial efficiency, however important lessons could be learned about considerable savings in transport and rental/servicing costs by making the Field station the HQ, with limited Georgetown based agents using the home as office or renting a room in a fully serviced office. Sourcing of products and services from local communities and Brazil may reduce costs in relation to the Field Station.

6.5 International board of trustees established

An interim board first met on 21/7/92 as the Interim Board of Trustees. The first meeting of the International Board of Trustees was on 15/1/97. Meetings have been held at least annually since 1992 so the output has been achieved. There is no cost data available per meeting.

A review of the quality and efficiency of the board is outside the scope of this review.

A review of the ComSec role within IBOT is outlined in section 6.13.

6.6 Centre with Communication and Information Unit developed

The Act defines centre in a manner not common to English usage as a “body corporate” (Article 23).

It was envisaged (Article 19) that the expenses of the Centre including the remuneration of the DG and other core staff would be paid out of the “*funds and resources of the Centre*”. This implies that the Centre was to have its own fund. This is completely different from having project funds or funds linked to the vagaries of “profitable centre linked business”

It is clear, therefore, that this output has not been achieved.

The accounts are not detailed enough to enable financial efficiency analysis.

The main finding is that there is no need to link a communication and information unit with a body corporate.

There are also problems in linking public service functions and business e.g. knowledge linked tourism do not fit well into the Act’s vision of a single body corporate.

The presence of the Centre for International Forest Research (CIFOR) and the internet means that there is no need for another “centre” that duplicates its function

6.7 Programme developed

The Act (Article 5) suggests not one, but many research and training programmes to include:

- Sustainable management of the tropical rain forest
- Conservation and utilisation of biodiversity
- Forestry research
- Sustainable human development
- Information and communications

The Act (Article 6) suggests a number of activities (13 in number) required to facilitate the programmes.

It is clear that the assumption behind these lists is one of massive funds, with no clear mechanism or instrument for integrating and or prioritising work in relation to the analysed need for lessons learned.

In terms of attribution and performance it is important to distinguish between the project phases:

1995 to 1998. “The programme years”

1999 to 2007. “Using business to fund research”

The “programme years” have been evaluated by the multi-donor mid term review (MDMTR) of April 2001, which found good progress in understanding the Iwokrama ecosystem and in relation to human resource development (working with local communities) and good international collaborative efforts.

The review found weaknesses in a lack of an in-house economist, lack of appropriate management information systems (including monitoring and evaluation), poor application of lessons learned, and the lack of a trust fund.

The lack of adequate baselines and monitoring of community involvement and gender continues to this day, so the evaluation team could not obtain quantitative data on clearly attributable effects now that local communities receive funds from many sources outside those managed by Iwokrama.

Overall, it can be concluded from the comments of the review team, that an effective programme had not been achieved by 2000.

Unfortunately most of the evaluations done by other donors on their programmes e.g. DFID appear to have been lost.

The ComSec was not a significant funder of the programmes during this period, so financial efficiency analysis is not appropriate.

The period post 1999 has been one of delivering on donor commitments, in relation to projects funded during the previous phase, and acting as a host to research projects funded and designed by others on an ad hoc basis. All of the weaknesses outlined by the MDMTR in 2001 were still in evidence in December 2007 and were compounded by the lack of a qualified DG.

In terms of the funding by the ComSec, it is important to distinguish between funding the Centre and the Programme.

Centre funding has become focussed on emergency support to the body corporate in relation to business plans (Metz 1997 and Glover 2003) that seek to derive income from commercial ventures or joint ventures. Research has been included in this on the assumption that it is “profitable”.

The ComSec has not funded any programme of research. The work of the forester, Mr Ken Rodway was funded by a mixture of centre and site funding.

The centre aspects of the work of the forest manager relate to the extent of rapid profit made from low impact logging.

As there has never been any stable income from any of the business plans, the executives have not had the freedom to design programmes.

In conclusion, an influential programme for research and training has yet to be developed.

The programme expectations of the Act are totally unrealistic in today’s economic climate and consolidation and focus on current strengths and income streams is the order of the day.

6.8 Archive developed and maintained as an inviolable resource

The Act stipulates in Article 27 that the archives shall be inviolable.

This output has not been achieved. There is not even a complete list of information resources.

IBOT is not fulfilling its minimal role of protecting the shareholders interest. In the absence of diplomatic immunity, the partners would be legally liable for this serious deficiency

Recommendation 4 The ComSec should fund a mission to prepare a proposal for an inviolable web based archive and a book with emphasis on key outputs and lessons learned. This should be linked to the ComSec's own website and benefit from their media and information resources

6.9 “Core fund” obtained

This is termed “support for the Iwokrama international centre” in the Act. It was originally envisaged that a number of committees including a donor support would help to identify a core fund for the unallocated core operations and infrastructure.

The term core fund refers to a reserve where interest can be used.

This output has not been achieved. There is not even a formal attempt to calculate the cash needs of each of the Act components or a strategy developed as to how the funds might be obtained

The evaluation team could not find any documentary evidence of ComSec support being used to leverage soft (project) funds from other organisations, however most interviewees felt that the support gave credibility.

If it were assumed that the most critical element of Iwokrama was to monitor and protect the site, the current ranger cost would be around £30k per year. The sum required to obtain this, using interest at 6% would be £500,000. This is likely to be a minimum sum. None of the business plans were geared to obtain this as a capital sum.

6.10 “Unexpected” outputs

As with most endeavours of over 15 year duration there are likely to be many unexpected outputs over and above what was expected from any foundation document.

Given that the aim of this review is to advise the ComSec on future options, it is important to restrict the search to those unexpected outputs with undue influence or positive multiple and central benefits.

6.10.1 Idea that a lesson learning programme can be funded by income generated by a deficit linked business plan approach tested

The “output” of a business plan for the Centre appears to have emerged at the first meeting of the IBOT on 15/1/97.

The ComSec must have gone along with the idea as it was agreed at IBOT level. However the level of attribution is difficult to calculate because there was never any funding from the ComSec for the special costs associated with operating a business plan i.e. for an entrepreneur. The only evidence of financial contribution is for the compilation (aggregation of secondary data) design and production of the latest plan in “brochure” form. The total cost was at least £45,000 (PAF GIWO017).

Since 1997 there have been two business plans: The first produced on 21/4/97 by Don Mentz was for ten years and operated 1998 to 2007. The second organised by Edward Glover and produced in 2004, for five years from 2006 to 2010.

It may be useful in the first instance to show what these plans are not.

- They are not an attempt to prioritise outputs in relation to a clear *purpose* and then decide how the outputs could be funded by minimal cost i.e. a consolidation or survival plan. In fact, both plans end up with a cash deficit (Mentz £6m and Glover £750k).
- They are not proposals to test corporate models in relation to key forest land issues in a way to maximise lessons learned.

The Mentz plan tests the hypothesis that costs for research, institutional infrastructure and staffing can be met by using profit from appropriate businesses. It notes that no similar body has ever achieved this and admits that even CABI (who had instantly saleable products not requiring major investment) did not have to cover infrastructure costs.

Assumptions were presented and the onset of income appeared reasonable:

- Value added on timber is significant at £50k year 6 and £200k year 10
- Biodiversity prospecting moderate at £5k year 4 and £25k year 10
- Tourism most important at £25k year 3 and £350k year 10
- Training information and art significant at £30k year 4 and £125k year 10

Space does not permit a full financial analysis. Limited financial figures (using the 1997 exchange rate of £0.8 = \$1) are presented. £14.8m pounds in earned income including research overhead recovery were expected after 10 years at a cost of £20.8m giving a final net deficit of around £6m

Accounts provided by Dane Gobin (including un-audited 2007 data) show an actual total earned income (excluding research overhead recovery) of around £1m at a cost of £7m (including all research costs).

It appears that the Mentz plan failed for the following reasons:

- It is too complex with too many possible income sources

- Costs were underestimated in terms of the cost of the entrepreneur to get business and make appropriate deals (This could be done by scientists and others in their spare time).
- The attractiveness of Guyana and Iwokrama to investors was overestimated.
- The early onset of profit from complex ventures was too optimistic.
- There was confusion between sales and marketing.
- The idea that a significant overhead recovery is possible for research projects is not justified.

It is clear that it would have been expedient for the IBOT to obtain an external evaluation of the Mentz business plan before embarking on a new one.

It is too early to comment on business performance in relation to the Glover Plan, however the failure mechanisms listed above for Mentz are still operating in the Glover Plan and the onset of profit is more optimistic in Glover e.g. £9.5k from timber in 2006 (year 1).

The Glover plan if implemented leads to a net cash deficit of around £750,000

Good aspects of the Glover Plan include:

- Useful material in the appendices that could be used as flyers or adverts for business opportunities.
- It shows pride in the achievement of the inclusion of local communities in the management of the forest.
- It has a positive spirit and sees “IIC as guardian of Iwokrama for the benefit of the international community is determined to be an ally with other prestigious institutions....”
- Clear design, typography and layout of brochure.

The review team found problems with:

- The lack of purpose and the key outputs defined when investment is obtained.
- Identifying and including the aspirations of the neighbouring communities.
- Combining disparate documents together. Three separate entities are required in order to communicate effectively with the board, benefactors and investors.
- The lack of a financial information system linked to outputs *is a serious deficiency*.

On the face of it, the output has been produced and can be described as good. In terms of *effectiveness*, a deficit linked business plan is not the way forward during average times and is certainly not the way forward in times of financial crisis

6.10.2 At least one forest ranger adopts a learning approach

This output came from email discussions between the evaluation team and former DGs and was confirmed by discussions with current London based trustees. The term forest ranger refers to the national staff who patrol and protect the forest and also guide tourists. The lack of monitoring and evaluation in the project has meant that this output is yet to be fully characterised and developed

The output is efficient in terms of cost and technical approaches and effective in terms of practical lessons learned

The output has been exceeded and the quality of the output is World Class

The financial efficiency is currently high because knowledge linked tourists tend to require lower investment costs. The activity could become an income rather than a cost centre with minimal investment.

The lesson categories could be formalised and developed to include:

- How to supplement income and set up a development fund using tips and sponsorship from a specific kind of knowledge based tourist.
- How to preserve and develop indigenous knowledge linked to positive feedback from tourists.
- The critical aspects of success of joint approaches with local people.
- Constraints to the “offender” detection capture and arrest procedure (Annex 3 Para 300).
- How to show the Government of Guyana that Iwokrama has a macroeconomic impact using the number of class x tourists as an indicator.

6.11 “Missing” outputs

It is common to have missing outputs in development endeavours, where implementers have overlooked a critical issue in the foundation agreement. This is especially the case if the foundation document is complicated,

It is unusual that the missing output was missing in the foundation agreement. This is a design error.

The missing output is “Decision support system developed to produce at least one lesson on maximising relevance, impact, sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency and customer satisfaction.”

The indicator would be a number of lessons learned. The system would be available for use by all stakeholder and would take logical framework based monitoring evaluation and learning as a starting point

The following systemic improvements would be expected from best practice:

- Greater access to funds and support from donors and sponsors

- Realistic job descriptions at all levels including the IBOT
- Progress (in relation to a clear *purpose*) as opposed to going backwards or being trapped in circular actions
- Greater clarity, realism and coherence (integration) in programme design and implementation
- Increased satisfaction from Government of Guyana and the ComSec with functional and timely plans, reports and financial management systems
- A clear exit strategy for donors based on self-sufficiency/buyout/buy-in of key elements

6.12 Reflections on the efficiency role of the ComSec

There is no evidence of ComSec facilitation of efficiency in day files or IBOT minutes

Two elements could be responsible for this failure:

- A structural relationship problem: Is the channel of communication between the chair and the officer or the DG and the officer etc. conducive to sharing and lesson learning?, and is the situation being helped by senior management?
- Lack of capacity: Does the officer have appropriate time and training in terms of interpersonal skills, technical, and project management knowledge etc?

7.0 EFFECTIVENESS

7.1 Introduction

Effectiveness relates to whether the project purpose has been obtained, and indicates which of the following outputs made significant contributions to its achievement

1. One Act produced
2. Field site gazetted and baselines characterised
3. HQ located and equipped
4. Centre with Communication and Information unit sustained
5. International board of trustees established
6. Programme developed
7. Archive developed and maintained as an inviolable resource
8. “Core fund” obtained
9. Idea that a lesson learning programme can be funded by income generated by a deficit linked business plan approach tested
10. At least one forest ranger adopts a learning approach

7.2 The project purpose

The project purpose was formulated as “practical lessons learned on how to manage forest lands continuously within vulnerable nations, in a way that contributes to the wellbeing of local communities, and the protection of aspects of biodiversity and environmental services by date X”

It is clear to the review team that the project purpose has been partially achieved (25%) in that insights have been gained (as evidenced by internal reports and publications) in relation to the following categories:

- The importance of the forest lands concept as opposed to protection of “forests”.
- Local low impact logging versus the FSC approved certification approach.
- Low cost approaches to monitoring and protecting forest lands.
- The efficacy of the Guyana protocol (government free zone) and its establishment through an Act, in relation to global environmental issues including the challenge of climate change.
- Pitfalls in the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Ecosystem Degradation (REDD) approach to climate change.
- Institutional development and indigenous knowledge in local communities in relation to environmental protection and sound management.
- Corporate and partnership approaches as part of environmental stewardship and learning.
- Limitations and potentials for using donor and public support for long term environmental ventures.

The quality of these insights can be described as Good

Serious deficiencies were present in that

- Lessons were never made practical because of the lack of the decision support system that would have helped in prioritisation of lessons in what, for whom and how they should be packaged/transmitted.
- insights remain with the Amerindian people involved with the project, and former project staff and advisors to Iwokrama and rather than in reports.

7.3 One Act produced

The most important contribution that the Act has made to the project purpose is to test the efficacy of an Act of Parliament with an international co-signatory used to stabilise the Guyana protocol in a way that is respected by donors and investors. The effectiveness was good in that it showed that it can be achieved and is more powerful than a simple concession. As a pilot attempt it was bound to be unwieldy and lessons have been now learned from this review. The pilot cost can be

estimated at £1m with a replication target of £200k

7.4 Field site gazetted and baselines characterised

The effectiveness of this activity can be described as Good. The output could have been excellent if zones of influence were delineated. The pilot cost could be estimated at £2m which is replicable at £5 per hectare. Major lessons have been learned on reducing costs using natural boundaries, indigenous knowledge and local labour.

7.5 International board of trustees established

Assessment of the effectiveness of the board is beyond the remit of this review. Analysis of the ideal ComSec role in it is outlined in section 7.13

7.6 HQ located and equipped

This was not an effective output. Other projects have learned more from trying different locations and structures for HQs.

7.7 Centre with Communication and Information unit sustained

Establishing a body corporate with board members with limited relevant corporate and technical knowledge, a chief executive with limited relevant vision, project management and international experience, and without CGIAR being interested in being involved, has not been effective in terms of producing practical lessons.

7.8 Programme developed

A project with a logical framework, decision support system, and socio-economic cost benefit framework would have been more effective than a programme. The situation was exacerbated by poor donor coordination leading to wasteful (sometimes duplicate) parallel and co-funding.

7.9 Archive developed and maintained as an inviolable resource

This output has not been produced.

7.10 “Core fund” obtained

This output has not been produced

7.11 Idea that a lesson learning programme can be funded by income generated by a deficit linked business plan approach tested

This output is not effective. An external review of the idea one year after operation (1999) would most probably have led to its termination.

7.12 At least one forest ranger adopts a learning approach

This is the most effective output of the whole endeavour and is World Class for reasons outlined in section 6.10.2. The cost of this in a project framework with learning aspects would be in the order of £100k per year

7.13 Reflections on ComSec's role to improve project effectiveness.

This role is endorsed or originated at IBOT level by the Deputy Secretary General (DSG), as deputy chair, and by the presence of ComSec observers, such as project officers.

Expected roles are:

1. To clarify and update its representation and role on the IBOT.
2. To monitor the human resources strategy and the human resources framework of the programme (including aspects relating to the chair) with emphasis on duty of care to posts funded by the ComSec.
3. To carry out due diligence on all arrangements involving risk capital and private companies.
4. To endorse the plans and reports of the programme executives after a quality check.
5. To inform the project executives of financial opportunities or constraints with emphasis on Commonwealth Governments and International donors contributions to a core fund.
6. To effect steerage directly in relation to the Act by invoking appropriate articles.
7. To effect steerage by mobilising relevant committees and external reviews.

Analysis of all board minutes, starting with the interim board meeting on 27/7/92, shows numerous important steering interventions by the Government of Guyana representatives, the Chair, DG, and Sydney Allicock (Amerindian representative). There appears to be no record of any useful steering intervention from the ComSec. It appears that representatives have usually taken on the role of observers. The only obvious break from this tradition has been the mobilisation of this review in relation to item 10. It is clear that apart from this, the ComSec has not been effective in this role.

Serious deficiencies in the ComSec's role include:

- The secretariat has failed to take up the opportunity to have two active members on the board; it would be essential to have both a technical and a financial advisor on the board. Having the DSG only has negative consequences in addition to cost implications. It can undermine the ability of Secretariat project officers to manage the assistance. For example there is evidence that reports were withheld because, “ we don't need to send you any reports because the DSG was at the last meeting and took note of everything we said”
- The position of chair has no clear job description, line management, terms of dismissal or succession policy.
- There have been instances where an appointed chair has had a conflict of interest e.g. Angela Cropper (also chair of CIFOR).

- There is no grievance or arbitration procedure for project executives if they do not get satisfaction reporting to seniors (the chair in the case of the DG).
- Some joint venture agreements are confidential. This is in direct conflict with the lesson learning.
- The programme has never produced an annual or global workplan or an annual report that would be acceptable to a donor. Clear *outputs* to be delivered by date X are absent. Critical DG inception reports are rarely produced.
- The ComSec did not act on the critical recommendation of the EC evaluation that “all documents should be backed up in electronic form and stored adequately in a fire/flood proof box.” Many archives have been lost due to flood damage and the ComSec archive has many missing documents for reasons not fully understood.

Problems in the ComSec's role include:

- There appears to have been no direct advice to the programme concerning UN or Commonwealth linked political opportunities in relation to the environment.
- There has been no direct advice to the programme concerning UN or Commonwealth linked financial opportunities in relation to the environment.
- The severe constraint of duplication with CIFOR and its effect on the programme’s access to limited donor funds has never been acted upon.
- The ComSec has not ensured that the key recommendations of the MDMTR have been acted upon.
- The programme has never had a clear purpose, logical framework, indicators etc. or adopted any of the relevant guidelines in the ComSec project management manual.
- There is no evidence of any tactical direction of the form “please now concentrate on X due to shifts in donor priorities” in any board minutes.
- The idea of a fundamental and essential requirement for a one-off reserve fund, where interest could be used to fund core operations was implicit in the Act and made explicit by NC at the 3rd board meeting of 22/9/98. Interest was required at a level of \$1m per annum (*Indicating a fund of \$20m at 5% interest*). This issue remains unresolved today. Few lessons have been learned from the state of affairs in terms of market research, creative solutions or engineered buyouts by relevant organisations.
- A fundamental tenet of the endeavour’s design evolution was that a major part of the solution and quality assessment for the sustainable development and linked governance reform of forest lands could involve indigenous peoples. It is therefore odd that an Amerindian was not

appointed to the board until ninth meeting on 30/11/02. There also appears to have been little formal capacity building/ training of the individual so that the position could be taken up in an active rather than token manner. In the interests of gender equity there should also be positions for a male and a female representative. Consideration should also be given to child/youth representatives in relation to UN guidelines.

- The endeavour has never had a decision support system as recognised by most donor agencies.
- The ComSec failed to act effectively to ensure that the terms of reference for the multi-donor mid term review included a study on design (problems with the Act) or relevance (the core reason why many donors were not interested). The MTR was, therefore, superficial with no steerage benefit.
- The donor support group has never been effectively established. The first group, outlined at the first board meeting, consisted of members of UNDP IDRC and Government of Guyana. The Government of Guyana is a recipient of aid, UNDP the only donor as IDRC is effectively an operational arm of CIDA involved with small projects. Donor roundtables have not been maintained.
- The Advisory Panel on Sustainable Human Development was to tender advice on issues relating to Amerindian welfare, environment, equity, employment, and advancement of women, as related to the work of the Centre. The members of the Panel were to include media experts, environmentalists, social scientists, anthropologists, ecologists and representatives of women's and Amerindian organisations. This has never been carried out.
- The board is receiving excellent, regular and important advice from the NRDDDB via Mr Sydney Allicock. E.g. 5th meeting comment about “only two legs on the three legged stool” meaning government partnership is missing in local delivery of services and timely intervention plans to shift timber extraction from Fairview to elsewhere (13th meeting).
- Annual reports have been sporadic. It was minuted at the 8th board meeting that there had been no reports for five years. The reports are also of poor quality, dealing only with activities and not results.
- The 13th meeting on 30/4/06 minuted that this was the first time in the history of the centre that the previous years audited accounts had been received before the first quarter of the proceeding year.
- The current accounting system takes research projects as income. This is spurious. Unless full economic costing is used (100% overhead estimate) the research project is probably a net drain on financial resources.

- The number of DG resignations is very high

The overall conclusion is that the ComSec's role on the board to make sure that the project is focussed or in evaluation terms, *key results are developed to achieve the project purpose* has failed. With the lack of advisory committees, the need for timely external reviews of effectiveness is increased

7.14 Focussing so as to improve project effectiveness.

Rain forest lands have many ways that they contribute and can potentially contribute to the economy. It could be argued that the one thing that rain forest have in abundance is potential and this is often overwhelming for projects. There are two approaches that the project could have used to give focus so that they could effectively concentrate on the most important results with limited resources. The first would have been to employ an economist with experience of forest lands. This was pointed out by the multi donor mid term review, but alas, has been ignored. The second would have been to have set up a monitoring evaluation and learning system based on a logical framework. This has also not happened. The business plans have continued a "shotgun approach" which is an acknowledged strategy with a high level of staff inputs but is questionable when resources are tight.

7.15 Framework for identifying the most effective output when funds are limited.

The Glover Plan assumes that a Centre can develop a Programme of research funded by income from four businesses; Sustainable timber, Tourism, Training Services, and Intellectual Property. The effectiveness question is: Which of these existing activities can quickly lead to (1) most practical lessons learned on how vulnerable (often poor and sometimes corrupt) nations can manage forest lands. For Iwokrama the caveat is that the lesson learning should be (2) rapid, (3) inexpensive (not capital intensive), (4) not duplicate other efforts and (5) the benefits should be obvious (attractive to others)

Sustainable timber based on FSC methods can provide a high number of lessons learned but is very expensive and slow to implement the system. Its profitability has yet to be proven. It is also very expensive to study the costs and benefits. It could be that local low impact artisan approaches with centre of origin certification could have the greatest socio-economic benefit. The FSC approach is not currently attractive to countries that look to major markets in China and India. National governments linked to ITTO and the CGIAR are involved in this work and there is not a clear case for duplication by Iwokrama.

Tourism is a globally expanding market and Iwokrama is well placed to cater for knowledge based tourism (KBT) where people pay above average to learn about nature and or culture. It is already happening within the project and many lessons are being learned. The benefits to the national and local economy are clear and simple (inexpensive) to monitor and evaluate. The idea

that tourism could pay for or contribute towards the cost of the protection of forest lands and the development of local culture could generate much useful and highly relevant learning. KBT requires less investment than mass tourism as people will accept local transport and accommodation if the rewards are high. KBT is not a central activity for the CGIAR.

The provision of hosting services for training and research is a highly competitive market. It is profitable only if the costs of the internationally recognised trainers and or International quality research infrastructure are covered. Practical lessons on how to do this have already been learned by most Commonwealth governments. A limited amount of highly specific research and training income could be achieved as an adjunct to KBT

Intellectual property benefits to Countries with rain forest lands have been slow to materialise and are very expensive and take considerable time to procure and police. Other centres would be better placed to develop this

Most visitors to Iwokrama have observed that the most successful element in terms of number of benefits appears to be KBT visits to the unique forest lands associated with Iwokrama (forest, waterways, wetlands and unique local culture). Can a model be developed where lessons are adopted (outside Iwokrama) and the Iwokrama forest is protected in perpetuity by a local forest guide entity funded by revenues from KBT?

7.16 Delivering lessons learned from profitable knowledge based tourism in a way that would influence and benefit the Government of Guyana and the International community.

Options for the delivery include:

1. Iwokrama International Centre (the status quo)
2. Another research centre or University
3. A public private (government and company) partnership via concession
4. A public private local partnership via concession e.g. a company employing local people with share benefits

Options for ComSec involvement include

1. Part of the body corporate known as Iwokrama International Centre (the status quo)
2. As a member of an international tender steering and monitoring committee involving other Commonwealth members
3. Tender preparation and launch involvement only. Com Sec involvement ends as tender is given

Recommendation 5. The ComSec should fund a logical framework based project

preparation mission for preparing a tender for a concession on lesson transmission and adoption via knowledge based tourism linked to forest guides who can protect the forest. They should consider the ideal nature of the concessionaire entity (Private company/public private partnership/Community based organisation etc)

8.0 IMPACT

8.1 Introduction

The impact is the contribution of the project purpose to the goal and possibly mechanisms where the results have contributed without the project purpose being achieved.

The goal can be stated as “Governments and civil society adopt (at least n) procedures and practices that serve to protect forest lands continuously in a way that contributes to the wellbeing of local communities, and the protection of aspects of biodiversity and environmental services by date X”

8.2 Findings

It is normal for a programme to have defined its own impact pathways and commissioned external studies on these pathways. This has never been done by Iwokrama executives.

The MDMTR also did not assess impact or suggest impact pathways.

Possible impact pathways are listed below.

1. High impact programme publications (*sensu* Web of Knowledge) cause practitioners and or policy makers to change behaviour in Guyana or internationally.
2. Professionally produced programme briefing notes or lessons learned cause practitioners and or policy makers to change behaviour in Guyana or internationally.
3. Visitors (including tourists and trainees) to or neighbours of Iwokrama replicate approaches or practices in their own locations.
4. Professionally produced programme briefing notes or lessons learned cause practitioners and or policy makers to change behaviour in the Commonwealth.

The review team could find no evidence of any impact apart from tourism and community empowerment approaches being replicated by the Amerindian communities. This was done in an open way through good facilitation methods, so the impact is good.

The programme does not have an up to date publication list and is not aware of journal impact approaches.

The programme does not appear to have ever produced a professional briefing note.

Visitors and neighbours behaviour is not monitored post visit.

The lack of any professional impact assessment over the period of 18 years is a serious deficiency.

8.3 Reflections on ComSec Role One: Facilitating Impact

One of the primary roles of the ComSec is to facilitate agreed courses of action minuted in the communiqués of CHOGMs.

The Iwokrama endeavour is bracketed by two CHOGM minutes, the first in 1998 to launch a *pilot project* under commonwealth auspices to study utilisation of the forest on a sustainable basis and the conservation of species.

The second in Uganda 2007 “renewed its commitment to the Iwokrama rain forest programme at the Lake Victoria CHOGM held in 2007” and issued a directive to the ComSec for “more effort in relation to increasing international awareness and support.”

In a sense, the ComSec has a responsibility (via IBOT and other meetings) along with the Centre for facilitating mutual learning between the project and Guyana and between the project and the international community (with emphasis on the Commonwealth). It has many instruments at its disposal for doing this.

The above are important impact pathways and there is no evidence that the ComSec has ever carried out any such actions, apart from participating in a recent meetings on Iwokrama with the Commonwealth Forestry Association and the Commonwealth Foundation. Even this was not initiated by the Secretariat. It can therefore be stated that the ComSec on the whole has failed in its role to facilitate impact.

The active development of a archive website has already been recommended and would assist with impact pathway 4

Recommendation 6. The ComSec should facilitate a Commonwealth working group on forest lands and their continuous contribution to the national economy in the face of the challenge of climate change. This working group is to be the main recipient and disseminator of Iwokrama findings and recommendations. It could also be given a task of fund raising for Iwokrama and other relevant endeavours

9.0 SUSTAINABILITY

9.1 Introduction

Sustainability refers to the likelihood of a continuation in the stream of benefits produced by the Iwokrama after the period of external support has ended.

Standard evaluation approaches are normally not very good at identifying these at mid term or the end of a project. It is usually only post completion evaluations that have identified the key mechanisms.

In simple terms the mechanisms can include financial, institutional, policy linked, technological, socio-cultural or individual mechanisms.

The use of elements of Appreciative Inquiry has located energy for change within certain groups and individuals. This has an important bearing on possible futures.

9.2 Findings

The review team identified some useful appropriate technology in relation to building low carbon offices and accommodation. It is highly likely that this will spread and continue.

Many of the low impact low cost logging and timber processing approaches will continue.

The archive will not be sustainability conserved if funds stop.

The Act will remain unless revoked. The latter will probably not be acceptable to the citizens of Guyana.

In terms of **environmental sustainability**, the sovereign land will remain protected by the Government of Guyana and is safer now than 18 years ago because of increased awareness. Protection of forest cover will be easier than from illegal hunting or collecting.

The Centre would not continue and this could be a good thing given the current latent energy for change in various quarters.

Knowledge based tourism linked to forest rangers could form a sustainable forest protection and lesson learning institution e.g. company or cooperative funded by appropriate tourism and, if correctly facilitated, could be effective and self financing.

Recommendation 6. The ComSec should fund a logical framework based project preparation mission for preparing a tender for a concession on lesson transmission and adoption via knowledge based tourism linked to forest guides who can protect the forest. They should consider the ideal nature of the concessionaire entity (Private company/public private partnership/Community based organisation etc)

The Guyana protocol could have a life of its own and the current president is keen to involve other large areas of forest lands.

The North Rupununi District Development Board (NRDDDB) and linked entities appear to have galvanised socio-cultural aspirations and when it becomes a district council will probably expand and be replicated.

The review identified the following energy for change amongst key stakeholders that could be

harnessed to effect sustainability:

- Sydney Allicock, (IBOT) advocacy linked to documenting mistakes.
- Edward Glover, (IBOT) persuading hard nosed clients to support Iwokrama.
- Richard Henessy, (IBOT) learning and tourism, climate and other links through university action.
- The Right Hon Desrey Fox, learning linked to language and cultural aspects of environmental poverty.
- Janet Strachan, (ComSec) environmental development and the climate challenge within the commonwealth.
- Raquel Thomas, (Iwokrama project officer) plan for research hosting.
- Roxroy Bollers and Chris Chin (Iwokrama project officers) for information handling.

It is highly likely that all former employees, visitors, and trainees have come away with at least one positive experience and the effects of this will spread and grow in the absence of funding.

In summary, the chances of sustainability for key elements of Iwokrama are Excellent

10. RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMSEC PROCEDURES

10.1 Findings

The Iwokrama endeavour is technically complex and requires highly specialised technical assistance beyond that of an environmental advisor. The key skill set relates the macroeconomic assessment of the potential use of forest lands. In depth experience is required in relation to project management including land use based decision support from monitoring evaluation and learning systems. The ComSec does not have this expertise. This has resulted in many shortcomings in relation to efficiency, effectiveness and impact.

A retained external consultant or consultancy company could assist in quality control and maintenance at all levels and stages in the project cycle:

Project preparation (Commonwealth expert group)

Project appraisal (checking design)

Project staffing (human resources framework and strategy)

Project monitoring

Project direction (briefing notes for IBOT members)

Recommendation 7 The ComSec should retain the services of a consultant for specialist inputs in relation to advice on efficiency, effectiveness and impact aspects of Iwokrama. This should include quality checking of project outputs, annual project reviews and IBOT briefing notes

11.0 FUTURE STRATEGY, FRAMEWORK AND OPTIONS

11.1 The future strategy and framework

The review found no evidence to suggest that project closure and immediate withdrawal of ComSec assistance was required.

In terms of strategy the review found that the funding of inputs had not worked and that funding of specified outputs was desirable.

Outputs are best monitored and achieved by using a logical framework approach linked to strong commitment

There is a need for the ComSec to decide on the level and duration of their commitment for the future in terms of funding the major outputs

These outputs form the list of options for the future

Recommendation 8 The ComSec should decide on which of the following outputs (options) it will fund. Any non funded outputs should be submitted to the Commonwealth via a relevant CHOGM in order to identify the level of support and any special funds

1. **The Archive (recommendation 4)**
2. **Better direction and monitoring through a retained consultant (recommendation 7)**
3. **The endowment fund mission (recommendation 3)**
4. **The institutional buy in mission (recommendation 2)**
5. **Formulation of a focussed logical framework project based on knowledge based tourism (recommendation 5)**

12.0 LESSONS LEARNED ON COMSEC AS AN INFORMED FACILITATOR

12.1 Introduction

The terms of reference (Annex One) asks the following questions

- To what degree has the Commonwealth support for the IIC helped to leverage support for the IIC from other sources? How significant is Commonwealth support in comparison to other sources of support?
- To what extent has the Secretariat's programme of assistance to Iwokrama achieved its intended results? How effectively and efficiently have the intended results been achieved by the Secretariat?
- What has been the impact of Commonwealth assistance to the IIC on local communities? How has the ComSec contributed to gender equality?
- To what extent has the Secretariat followed project management procedures in executing its programme of assistance and how much collaboration was evident internally and externally with partners in the delivery of the assistance? What constraints, if any, has the Secretariat encountered in the execution of its assistance and could these have been avoided?
- How effectively has the Secretariat participated in Iwokrama's governance structure?

12.2 Findings and recommendations

Previous sections have shown that ComSec has not been an effective facilitator of Iwokrama (including efficiency, effectiveness and impact

It is thought that this is due to organisational rather than simply procedural reasons

The overall conclusion is that ComSec has not followed recognised donor project management procedures in that it did not request a logical framework for the endeavour from the Commonwealth expert group in 1989 or ever since. There has been no formally agreed impact pathway (local or overall), plan for sustainability, gender guidelines or effective "steering" of the project at board level. ComSec has given credibility to the endeavour so that funds could be raised from other donors or agencies, but leverage in the form of strategic co-funding has not been achieved. The serious deficiencies in ComSec project management extend to failing to stipulate a robust (output as opposed to category based) financial planning and management system from the implementing team. This has led to a number of financial crises and the provision of "emergency funds". The lack of effective technical guidance (steering) and the availability of input as opposed to output link funds have given rise to the some members of IBOT seeing ComSec merely as the "banker of last resort"

Given the depth of the serious deficiencies, the review team concludes that training on project

management procedures alone is not enough. ComSec is required by the Commonwealth to be an “informed facilitator” at both political and technical levels. If this review of Iwokrama is representative of a typical ComSec technical endeavour, then it is clear that ComSec does not have the human resources framework to be a “learning organisation”. This is a pre-requisite for any facilitating organisation.

Recommendation 9 The ComSec should decide on whether it seeks to become an organisation that learns in order to be a more effective agency in the delivery of technical cooperation, and if so should contract an external consultant in organisational development in order to develop an appropriate human resources framework based upon Appreciative Inquiry.

Recommendation 10. Rapid facilitation of learning in relation to environmental development across Commonwealth countries should be carried out by establishing a Commonwealth award and medal scheme. External consultants could be used to develop a consultative proposal on this

Recommendation 11 The ComSec should obtain advice on their efficacy of the Guyana protocol of “making lands for Commonwealth purposes” being expanded in Guyana and duplicated across the Commonwealth as a network for learning on profitable solutions to the challenge of climate change. ComSec could start by investigating the outcome of recent offers made to the UK Government by the president of Guyana and in particular investigate if Iwokrama would be a good test case (due to richness of baselines) of a practical and broadly acceptable approach to the Reduction of Emissions through Deforestation and Degradation proposals

ANNEX ONE TERMS OF REFERENCE

Phase 2 of the Review of ComSec Support to Iwokrama Programme

Introduction

These Terms of Reference relate to Phase 2 of the Review of the Iwokrama Programme. A preliminary desk study was undertaken (Phase I) which involved a review of the Programme files and other documents and consultations with ComSec staff. The desk study documents the history and nature of the support provided by the Secretariat to the Programme during the period 1995 – 2007, the monitoring and review systems used by the Secretariat and the governance structure for the Programme. Phase 1 also included an examination and analysis of the Secretariat funding for the Programme including documentation of expenditure and an assessment of the financial arrangements in place for effective oversight and accountability. These reports prepared under Phase 1 - the desk study and the financial report - form part of the background information on the Iwokrama Programme for Phase 2 of the Review.

Phase 2 of the Review will involve the following:

1. A field examination of the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Secretariat's assistance aimed at supporting the Iwokrama Programme; and
2. On the basis of the field work, desk study and financial analysis assessment, prepare a report outlining the options for any future Secretariat assistance to the Iwokrama Programme and a framework of criteria on which such decisions should be based.

1. Programme Description

The Iwokrama International Rain Forest Programme was initiated following the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Malaysia in 1989. At that meeting, the then President of Guyana, Desmond Hoyte, offered an estimated 360,000 hectares of virgin rainforest for a programme, under the Commonwealth auspices, to develop and demonstrate methods of sustainable tropical forestry and of conserving biological diversity.

The Iwokrama International Centre for Rainforest Conservation and Development (IIC) - also called the Centre - was formed in 1996 under a joint mandate from the ComSec and the Government of

Guyana to manage the Iwokrama forest, “in a manner that will lead to lasting ecological, economic and social benefits to the people of Guyana and to the world in general”. The IIC is an international not-for-profit organisation located in Georgetown which is governed by an International Board of Trustees and operated by a management team.

Since the inception of the IIC, the ComSec has played an active role in the development of the Iwokrama Programme, by providing funding for technical assistance (mainly experts and staffing support) and in the governance of the IIC (as a member of the Board of Trustees and by appointing certain other members, some jointly with the Government of Guyana, including the Chair). Over the past 15 years the Government of Guyana and the IIC have surveyed and inventoried Iwokrama forest resources, developed legal and policy frameworks for operations, and established both physical infrastructure and programmes to support research and eco-tourism activities. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) has provided financial support from the time the Iwokrama Programme was inaugurated, primarily through provision of long-term technical assistance to the IIC totalling about 25 person-years. Short-term assistance on key technical issues such as business development has also been provided. The level of ComSec support is estimated to have been about £1.3 million since 1995.

2. Purpose of the Review

The ComSec has provided support to the Iwokrama Programme for about eighteen years. During this time there has not been any formal review by the Secretariat of the effectiveness or the impact of this assistance. The current phase of the Secretariat’s funding is due to conclude at the end of the 2007/08 financial year. In June 2007, the Management Committee had agreed that a Review be conducted of all assistance provided by the ComSec to the Iwokrama Rain Forest Programme since 1995.

The purpose of the Review will be to provide a solid foundation for the Secretariat to determine the nature and extent of its future involvement with the Programme. It will provide recommendations for the establishment of any future strategy for the Secretariat’s support to the Iwokrama Programme. An analysis related to the development effectiveness of the Commonwealth’s work in this area, and the sustainability of the environmental and financial model in place for the Iwokrama Programme, will help in the formulation of these recommendations.

3. Objectives and Scope for Phase 2

This Phase of the Review will involve a field assessment of the Programme to develop a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of the ComSec’s assistance to the Iwokrama Programme.

It will:

1. Review the extent and effectiveness of the Secretariat support to the IIC; and,
2. Assess the environmental and financial sustainability of the IIC and the potential implications for the ComSec and its future role.

The examination of these issues will inevitably touch on a number of related aspects and require exploration of specific questions.

- What have been the main outputs and benefits of Commonwealth support in different phases of development of the IIC?
- To what degree has the Commonwealth support for the IIC helped to leverage support for the IIC from other sources? How significant is Commonwealth support in comparison to other sources of support?
- To what extent has the Secretariat's programme of assistance to Iwokrama achieved its intended results? How effectively and efficiently have the intended results been achieved by the Secretariat?
- What has been the impact of Commonwealth assistance to the IIC on local communities? How has the ComSec contributed to gender equality?
- To what extent has the Secretariat followed project management procedures in executing its programme of assistance and how much collaboration was evident internally and externally with partners in the delivery of the assistance? What constraints, if any, has the Secretariat encountered in the execution of its assistance and could these have been avoided?
- How effectively has the Secretariat participated in Iwokrama's governance structure?

In the light of this analysis the Review will recommend a suitable strategy for the Secretariat that provides a sufficient and robust rationale for any further investment of CFTC funding. If no further funding is to be provided, a phase-out strategy for the Secretariat will be outlined that minimizes the detrimental impact of the withdrawal on the Iwokrama Centre. Advice will also be given on any changes to the role of the Secretariat with respect of the governance arrangements for the Centre, including its future approach in the Board.

4. Review Process

4.1 Evaluation Workplan

Phase 2 of the Review will be conducted by a consultant team with expertise across a range of areas, including the design and implementation of sustainable forest management programmes, biodiversity and natural resource management, environmental planning and protection, community participation in resource use and management and financial viability of protected areas.

The consultant team will review the desk study and financial analysis reports produced during Phase I. On the basis of this information, other research, and interviews with ComSec staff, they will finalise the Terms of Reference and prepare a work programme and outline a workplan to guide the Review process, specifically to direct the field evaluation phase. The Workplan will describe how the evaluation will be carried out bringing refinement, specificity and elaboration to the investigation and analysis of the issues outlined above. The Workplan will contain a schedule for fieldwork and an outline of the report for discussion with the Strategic Planning & Evaluation Division (SPED) and the Review taskforce.

The review Workplan will address the following elements:

- The overview of the Programme and priority issues to be examined;
- The roles and responsibilities of the review team;
- The review methodology and the framework that will be used to structure and guide the Phase 2 investigations;
- Approaches to data research, collection and analysis;
- The reporting schedule and the timing and content of reports to be prepared;
- The work schedule.

4.2 Field Mission

The review will include a field mission to Guyana to consult with different stakeholder groups, including the Government of Guyana, IIC Board members, staff of the IIC, local communities in the Iwokrama conservation area, business partners and NGOs/Friends of Iwokrama.

During the field visit in Guyana the team will review the activities implemented by the Secretariat under the Iwokrama Programme, consult with stakeholders and collect information in accordance with the workplan. Locations to visit in Guyana will include the IIC in Georgetown and the field station at Kurupukari in the Iwokrama Forest. The mission is expected to be between one to two weeks in duration.

On conclusion of the field visit the consultant team will provide feedback to the Secretariat and as requested make a presentation on key findings and draft recommendations to the Secretariat prior

to finalisation of the report. Any feedback comments will be incorporated within the final report for the Secretariat.

5. Deliverables, Timing and Resources

Phase 2 will provide the following deliverables to the Secretariat:

- Review work plan
- First draft of Review Report
- Seminar and presentation on findings
- Final Review Report

The consultant team will prepare an evaluation report that describes the conduct of the review and provides a clear summary of the findings, with sufficient analysis and documentation of evidence to substantiate these findings. The presentation of the results is to be linked to the review issues as outlined in Section 2 above, establishing the logical flow derived from the information collected.

The deliverables will be submitted to the Secretariat electronically in Microsoft. The draft workplan should be submitted within ten days of the signing of the contract and a draft Review Report within four weeks of returning from mission. Following the presentation of the review findings and receipt of feedback comments from the Secretariat and other stakeholders on the draft report, the Consultant is expected to submit a final Review report. The Review Report is expected to be 30-40 pages and should specifically respond to the Review questions relating to effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Secretariat's assistance to the Programme, as well as the future involvement of the Secretariat in the Programme.

6. Schedule and level of effort

Phase 2 of this study is planned to commence in November 2007 and require an estimate of 40 days. The consultant will undertake the fieldwork during November 2007 and produce a final report by December 2007.

Table 1: Projected Level of Effort

Activity	No of days (estimate)
Briefings & interviews in London	7
Workplan Preparation	2
Fieldwork	15
Draft report preparation, presentation of findings & report finalization (of which 2 days will be spent in London)	16
Total	40

Table 2: Implementation Schedule for Phase II of the Iwokrama Review

TASK	Nov 2007	DEC 2007
Briefings, documents review in London, workplan preparation		
Fieldwork in Guyana		
Preparation of draft report		
Delivery of seminar		
Report finalization		

ANNEX TWO ITINERARY

Date	Location	AM	PM
13/11/2007	UK	Briefings and interviews	Briefings and interviews
14/11/2007	UK	Workplan preparation	Workplan preparation
15/11/2007	UK	Briefings and interviews	Briefings and interviews
16/11/2007	UK	Briefings and interviews	Briefings and interviews
19/11/2007	UK	Workplan preparation	Workplan preparation
28/11/2007	UK	Workplan preparation	Oxford meeting
29/11/2007	UK	Workplan preparation	DSG Meeting
02/12/2007	UK	Depart 11.00	
03/12/2007	Guyana	Briefing	Briefing
04/12/2007	Guyana	Travel to field with David Singh	Travel to field with David Singh
05/12/2007	Guyana	Forestry	Forestry
06/12/2007	Guyana	Communities	Communities
07/12/2007	Guyana	Return to office	Return to office
08/12/2007	Guyana	Report analysis	Report analysis
09/12/2007	Guyana	Report analysis	Report analysis
10/12/2007	Guyana	organise meetings	organise meetings
11/12/2007	Guyana	11.00 James Singh	12.00 Pradeepa Bholanath
12/12/2007	Guyana	11.00 Rashleigh Jackson	Meetings
13/12/2007	Guyana	11.00 Hon S R Insanally	Meetings
14/12/2007	Guyana	09.00 Lance Carberry	11.30 Amb. Elisabeth Harper
15/12/2007	Guyana	Report analysis	Report analysis
16/12/2007	Guyana	Report analysis	Report analysis
17/12/2007	Guyana	13.30 Rodway Davis	14.30 Hon Carolyn Rodrigues
18/12/2007	Guyana	Report analysis	Report analysis
19/12/2007	Guyana	10.00 Hon Dr Desirey Fox	18.00 William Andries
20/12/2007	Guyana	Report Writing	Report Writing
21/12/2007	Guyana	Depart	10.00 check out 14.00 Fly
22/12/2007	UK	Return 20	Return 09.05 20

Date	Location	AM	PM
27/12/2007	UK	workshop preparation	Progress Meeting
31/12/2007	UK	Questionnaires and interviews	Review meeting preparation
04/01/2008	UK	2nd ComSec review meeting	2nd ComSec review meeting
10/01/2008	UK	workshop preparation	Evening Ian Swingland
13/01/2008	UK	workshop preparation	workshop preparation
14/01/2008	UK	Com Sec Archive	John Palmer
17/01/2008	UK	IBOT meeting 1	IBOT meeting 1
25/01/2008	UK	IBOT meeting 2	IBOT meeting 2
04/02/2008	UK	Presentation	Presentation

ANNEX THREE. LESSONS LEARNED ON FOREST BIODIVERSITY

Introduction

The endeavour has managed to learn some important practical lessons in relation to the protection of forest biodiversity.

Unfortunately these practical lessons are not contained in any report. The source of the following information is mainly from BioDiversity International Ltd's experience supplemented by answers from review questionnaires to ex-staff, IBOT members and ComSec officers. Many respondents have asked that information be kept confidential so the full data is not reproduced here.

The lessons have been edited in order to give maximum benefit in terms of issues that can be acted on in relation to future work of direct relevance to Iwokrama.

The lessons fall into the categories of institutions, monitoring, protection, enforcement and forest stewardship

Institutions

Many of the pressures on forest lands come from sectors outside forestry. It follows that, many of the solutions to sustainable development of forest lands come from sectors outside forestry. Therefore, any link with National Government should be with a super ministry e.g. the treasury or prime minister/presidents office or through a working group of ministers from relevant forestries (e.g. Environment, Agriculture, Tourism, Industry etc.).

Involvement of local peoples requires more than just information exchange. Capacity building and organisational development approaches are required in order to obtain outputs connected to local knowledge and local ownership of conservation objectives. Iwokrama focused on applying capacity building approaches. Organisational development will be required to obtain corporate approaches to conservation using local peoples. This will require a facilitation approach linked to process documentation with foreign experts as resource persons, not advisors.

Corporate partnership models are ideal in that they contain clarity and separate equity from executive issues. The private company model creates extra resilience as it establishes a separate "legal individual". Joint venture companies are generally too complicated. A contract between companies is preferable.

Indigenous knowledge is vital in developing a human ecosystem approach.

Keep language as simple as possible and make sure that critical indicators are thoroughly understood and that their means of verification does not rely on experts

Forest conservation based upon funding from donor institutions alone is not sustainable.

Any intervention should focus on youth as most communities see youth employment as a key issue and the youth often have more of a vested interest in the future along with having greater imagination and flexibility. However, there is a need to be conscious of the differing needs and interests of other groups (e.g. women and elderly). Any intervention should focus on the needs and interests of different local peoples (e.g. youth, women and the elderly). For example, youth employment is often a key issue for communities and the youth often have more of a vested interest in the future, along with having greater imagination and flexibility. Men may be more interested in extracting timber, whilst women may be more interested in preserving trees that provide economically important fruits.

“Appreciate, encourage and reward” rather than “study and evaluate”.

Form active networks with other similar joint approaches in other districts and or countries and recognise the special problems or non-representativeness of Guyana.

Monitoring

It is important to distinguish between forest function and forest biodiversity

Forest function can be monitored by simple proxy indicators such as streamflows, water turbidity and percentage canopy cover. All can be monitored by lay people if simple devices are used

Forest biodiversity is impossible to monitor as the term biodiversity is too broad and there are problems associated with attributing importance to its elements of ecosystem, species and intraspecific diversity

Forest biodiversity is a research topic not a practical approach

Proxy measures of biodiversity can be used that have economic and functional importance (maintaining diversity in other groups) e.g. populations of top predators

Protection

Forest function can be preserved by protecting forest cover. This can be achieved by transect walks and the detention of illegal loggers

Forest biodiversity can be protected by transect walks and the detention of illegal hunters or collectors

Both the above require trained, equipped rangers with incentive payments, sufficient to

reduce the chance of corrupt practices

Enforcement

Detention or arrest of offenders alone is not enough to act as a deterrent in many countries

A case tracking system is required as part of the monitoring system in order to track final fines and sentences. It also provides a good base line for advocacy in the case of inappropriate laws and procedures

Case tracking involves every event that occurs after offenders are handed over to Police or other government officers

Forest stewardship

There is currently much misunderstanding about the link between producing timber from Forest Stewardship Council certified forests and forest biodiversity

An FSC certified piece of timber means that the timber comes from a certified forest. For the forest to become certified it does not mean that all animal and plant species will be conserved. The emphasis is on the sustained yield of selected timber species and unless a special case is made for named other species, they will not automatically be conserved

ANNEX FOUR THE POST OF EXECUTIVE CHAIR

Background

Iwokrama is a joint endeavour established by the Government of Guyana and the ComSec involving 1 million acres of high biodiversity rainforest with a capitalisation in excess of over £30m

The project purpose of Iwokrama can be stated as “practical lessons learned on how to manage forest lands continuously within vulnerable nations, in a way that contributes to the wellbeing of local communities, and the protection of aspects of biodiversity and environmental services by 2015”

Practical lessons are to be passed on to the highest levels of Commonwealth Governments in a manner that will improve impact and sustainability

The Iwokrama International Centre for Rainforest Conservation requires a visionary and influential Executive Chair to spearhead organisational development from a research programme driven institution run by an International Board of Trustees to an output focused pilot project that, in turn, will lead to a highly influential pilot concession approach, to be ultimately sustained through delegated management

The transformation will require considerable cultural change and reorganisation within the current staff and some rationalisation at board level

Remuneration and Budget

The post is for a UK based senior consultant with a global reputation. Fees are payable at an international level for an input of a minimum of 4 months per year

The post will require frequent travel to Guyana for implementation linked activities, liaison with Commonwealth government agencies, and attendance at Board meetings in London or Georgetown

Per diems are payable along with eligible expenses

The Executive chair will also have access to a budget of X for Y months unallocated consultancy

Outputs required

Fully-costed project plan using logical framework and linked output budget approach. The focus of the plan will be lesson learning by indigenous forest rangers funded by knowledge linked tourism (LKM). LKM will include fees from nature tourists, and training/research hosting

Plan for splitting the existing body corporate into an international committee and forest lands management and learning company including human resource strategy and

framework and relevant CSR (objectively verifiable indicators in forest function, social uplift and economic benefit)

Preparation of draft tender document for management and technical assistance to facilitate the transition

Preparation of a proposal for investigating the development of a core fund through innovative approaches such as subscription, lotteries and or endowments

Direction and facilitation of all aspects of the above

Qualities and skills required

The post demands both vision and gravitas, to be combined with maximum diplomatic effectiveness

The post will require excellent facilitation, analytical and planning skills

Qualification and experience

At least 5 years relevant post doctoral experience is required, gained in an international setting as team leader or project director

Proven experience in cultural change and organisational development approaches

Familiarity with logical framework based project design is essential

Experience of tender preparation would be an advantage

Previous experience at board level is not essential

ANNEX FIVE. A GOVERNMENT FREE ZONE

Introduction

The idea of forest endowed countries offering large areas of forest to international concerns for minimal fees per unit area is not unique

Most timber royalties in poor countries are actually a net loss to the economy, the cost of collection being higher than the fee itself

Most logging concessions in poor countries provide social infrastructure benefits. This is commonly in the form of roads, trails, and workers camps and sometimes in the form of schools, health centres, villages and services (electricity, water, sewage etc)

Given the above, it is appropriate that a government would talk about income foregone if a logging concession was replaced by a conservation concession

In terms of investment by foreign entities, the most attractive option would be to buy the land freehold with development consent. This option should be pursued as it would also give maximum short term financial benefit to the country

The Guyana protocol

The Iwokrama Act appears to embody something quite unique in the global management of forest lands. The review team have termed this the “Guyana protocol” in the firm belief that this is of global significance

The elements of the Guyana protocol and the reasons why they are important are outlined below:

The land is enshrined by an Act of Parliament with no government co-signatory and cannot be overturned easily. This gives stability

In this case the co-signatory is respectable and stable. This gives confidence to investors

The area is devoid of restrictions and interference from government departments. This gives confidence to investors

The area is devoid of duties and taxes. It is a special economic development zone

Sub-contracting is allowed and encouraged if it conforms with the spirit of the Act

The area is large (>100k Ha) allowing economies of scale

Increased significance in the face of the challenge of climate change

The Guyana protocol has a central relevance in relation to the challenge of climate change because of the following reasons:

It gives the opportunity for profit generation from low carbon products linked to biodiversity and social welfare (double label advantage)

It gives the opportunity for International carbon synergy partnerships

It gives the opportunity for meaningful (North and South behaviour change) offsetting that can be readily validated

The above suggestion is not linked to the central tenets of the current REDD debate because:

It is focussed on actions by the private sector and not government

It is about profit and not “income foregone”

It is about innovation not ossification as it is not dependent on subsidy

It requires innovative thinking about simple verifiable indicators for the management of forest lands

Possible significance in relation to land reform

The Guyana protocol maybe useful in demonstrating the potential social and economic benefits of allowing foreign ownership of forest lands as occurs in the UK and other countries

ANNEX SIX FOREST LANDS AND ZONES OF INFLUENCE

Introduction

The Iwokrama field site is an important resource with direct relevance to two major conceptual developments in forest conservation and environmental services, including those in respect of the challenge of climate change

Forest Lands

There is a general recognition amongst professional foresters that attempts to conserve tropical “forests” or at least slow down the rate of deforestation have failed.

One of the reasons relates to the definition of “forest” which has distinct cultural meanings resulting in meetings where the participants think that they are talking about or agreeing actions concerning the same thing.

The official FAO definition is “Land spanning more than 0.5 ha with trees higher than 5m and a canopy of more than 10%, or trees able to reach these *in situ*. It does not include land that is predominantly under agricultural or urban use.”

The most extensive “forests” in China and India are mature agroforestry systems with Paulownia and Poplar. Most lay people, if they visited them, would describe them as forests and they have effects on soil and water like forests. FAO excludes them

Any lay person that visits a forest with a canopy of less than 40% would say that it is not a forest but a collection of widely spaced trees. FAO includes them.

Most “forest” in developing countries is on government land. This land rarely contains large areas of closed canopy forest. In some countries e.g. India the “forest lands” may not contain any trees. Governments operate on forest lands, not forest. If forest professionals want to influence governments, they should talk of forest lands and recognise the true management, functional and aspirational complexity that they represent.

Mining, agriculture, and hydroelectricity can be the most socio-economically appropriate uses of forest lands and can compliment forest biodiversity aspirations if appropriate sites and management systems are used

The sites of highest “forest biodiversity” are not the individual fragments of closed canopy forest, but the matrix of patches and spaces formed by fragments along altitudinal, or soil property gradients. Again forest lands is the most accurate term

Zones of influence

The Iwokrama field site was originally subdivided in terms of a core zone (wilderness protection)

and a buffer zone (sustainable utilisation). The sustainable utilisation zone included the Fairview Camp, with over 50 families. This zonation meant that the Iwokrama endeavour could have been described as an integrated conservation and development project (ICDP)

Many donor funded forest linked projects were based on the ICDP concept and most have failed because of untested assumptions and uncorrected design errors

Thinking on ICDPs has now moved on to zones of influence. The main distinction is the in the past “buffer zones” were delineated by a boundary at a set distance from the core zone, of so many miles. A “zone of influence” is a boundary set by a functional attribute.

In Iwokrama for instance the zone of influence in terms of water ecology probably extends to the whole Rupunnuni wetland.

Recent advances on atmospheric physics and chemistry indicate that the zone of influence of the forest that embeds Iwokrama may be tens or hundreds of miles.

The zone of influence in terms of hydropotential (for small and medium scale electricity generation) is likely to be large and delineated by topography.

The zone of influence in terms of representative forest lands research extends into all neighbouring countries including Brazil

Iwokrama

Iwokrama is uniquely placed to offer highly relevant lessons on all of the above if the new conceptual framework is adopted and an agreement at board level to work outside the existing boundary.

This will require two strategies

The first strategy has been outlined in terms of consolidation and simplification of practical lessons learned, using the forest rangers as the point of intervention

The second strategy will involve investigations with existing centres including the CGIAR, CATIE etc on synergistic partnerships and contractual arrangements

ANNEX SEVEN. FOREST PARTNERSHIPS

Introduction

The current strategy within Iwokrama in relation to community linked forestry revolves around the idea of a joint venture company with Tiger Woods Inc

This model is likely to prove unwieldy and is not the best model for maximising lessons learned

Problems were encountered by the review team in gaining access to key documents, so there are also concerns about transparency and due diligence

BioDiversity International Ltd has evaluated many community linked forest endeavours worldwide and one model sticks out as having the most advantages

The model is called a **“Tripartite Environmental Stewardship Contract”**.

The Partners

The three partners are normally:

A powerful absentee landlord desiring “rent” and concerned about retaining the asset value of the land. (Note this asset value of land would be reduced if land users took over through occupancy or tillage rights). This could be the national or regional government or in the case of Iwokrama “the body corporate”

People who desire land based livelihoods. In this case poor, marginalised people with indigenous knowledge of agroforestry, fishing or forestry etc who had formed a legally registered company with associated named directors and executives. This could be “Iwokrama forest rangers Inc”.

A brokerage company. In this case the company could advise on environmentally appropriate production and could locate international markets with added value. It was also capable of obtaining investment funds in the form of forward contracts. This could be “Knowledge based tourism Ltd”

The contract

The contract was very clear and was set for a term of over 20 years (this allowed for tree based interventions that take time to mature). The contract had:

A simple environmental statement e.g. to establish/maintain permanent plant cover with a review to restoring forest function

A share statement e.g. a 33:33:33 profit split between parties

An endowment to protect the weakest partner. In this case to pay for protection against takeover of the products from the agroforest by the landlord or company. This endowment could also be used to initially fund activities of the broker and or rehabilitate the poor (e.g. health and schooling)

A clear statement showing that the land remained the property of the landlord and was available to users under license i.e. not a tenancy and that all assets would revert to him at term.

A compensation clause if the landowner wanted to terminate the contract before term

The aim of the contract is simply to maximise profit for all concerned and contribute to the other stated aspirations of the contract

ANNEX EIGHT: LIST OF DOCUMENTS.

Type	Title	Author	Date	Soft	Hard
Foundation	The Act			Yes	Yes
Project documents or PAFS					
	GIWO series; 18,17,16,15,				Yes
	GIWO series; 7,8,9,10,11,12			Yes	
	GIWO series; 13,14				
	BCWG series; 187,172,148,125				Yes
	PGGUY001V				
	New ITTO project document				
	New EC ACP project document				
	The latest PAF that extends GIWO018 to end of July 2008?				
	New Darwin butterfly project document				
	Tropenbos chainsaw lumbering project document				
Annual progress reports					
	Annual 2007				
	Annual 2006	D Singh			Yes
	Annual 2005				
	Annual 2004	GW	November 2004		
	Report 2002-2003			Yes	Yes
	Summary report 1998-2002			Yes	Yes
	Five year progress report 1998-2002	K Monk	April 2002		Yes

Type	Title	Author	Date	Soft	Hard
“Occasional” reports					
	Message from the chairman to all staff	E.G.	December 2007	Yes	
	Report of the years activities up to November 30 2007	D Singh	December	Yes	Yes
	IIC Interim report 2007	D Singh	November	Yes	
	Final report to the Commonwealth	GW	2005		Yes
	Iwokrama November 2004	GW	November	Yes	Yes
	Inception report	GW	Sept 2004		
	Report to the ComSec	KM	June 2001 to May 2003		
	David Cassells				
Component report	Iwokrama Forest Management Planning	K Rodway?	2003?		Yes
	Draft Report of the SUA Planning Team Meeting No 3	S Ousman and R Thomas	September 2001		
	Participatory Human Resources Interaction Appraisals for the Communities of the North Rupununi March 24-25 1999 Fairview report		1999		Yes
	Forest management plan	K Rodway	2007	Yes	Yes
	Certification application				
	Certification response				
	End of assignment report	K Rodway	April 2007	Yes	Yes
Plans					
	Iwokrama research plan draft	R Thomas	2007	Yes	Yes
	Five Year Framework 2003-2007	G Watkins		Yes	Yes
	Business plan and workplan 2004-2006	G Watkins	2004	Yes	Yes
	Iwokrama accomplishments 2004 and plan for 2005				
	Operational Plan 1998-2002	Tschinkel			Yes
	Operational Plan 1996-2000				
	Operational Plan 1998-2000				

Type	Title	Author	Date	Soft	Hard
Business Plans and related briefs and support documents					
	Iwokrama business plan 2006-2010	E Glover	2006	Yes	
	Emergency meeting on Iwokrama	GW	December 2004	Yes	Yes
	Status of IIC	GW	December 2004	Yes	Yes
	Iwokrama business plan 2005-2006	G Watkins	November 2004	Yes	Yes
	Briefing note for DFID on Iwokrama Financial crisis		2004	Yes	Yes
	Iwokrama trust fund and fundraising strategy	G Watkins	2004	Yes	Yes
	Closing strategy for Iwokrama	G Watkins	2004	Yes	Yes
	The future of IIC	GW	January 2004	Yes	Yes
	Briefing not on funding sources	G Watkins	2003?	Yes	Yes
	Iwokrama Business plan	G Watkins	2003?	Yes	Yes
	Business Portfolio	G Watkins	2003?	Yes	Yes
	Final Report on Future Funding Iwokrama International Centre	D J Smith	May 2002	Yes	Yes
	Iwokrama Business Plan	J Palmer	April 1997	Yes	Yes
Consultant report	Harvesting timber from the Sustainable Utilisation Area Draft EIA	G Clark and V Radzik	May 2005		Yes
Lists	IIC filing system for forest certification			Yes	
External evaluations					
	GEF				
	UNDP				
	DFID Sustainable Human Development Sustainable Human Development 1998-2003 mid term review 2001? Terminal review 2003?				
	EC				Yes
	Multidonor			Yes	Yes

Type	Title	Author	Date	Soft	Hard
Internal monitoring and evaluation					
	Monitoring and evaluation of the Iwokrama programme (800.101)				
Financial and agreements					
	ITI shareholder agreement				
	Fairview and Iwokrama co management agreement				
	NRDDB Iwokrama relationship				
	NRDDB Iwokrama MoU				
	NRDDB Iwokrama Collaborative management agreement				
	NRDDB Minutes				
	ITI and TGI joint venture agreement				
	ITI audited statement 2005-2006				
	Audited account for year ending 2007				
	Audited account for year ending 2006				Yes
	Audited account for year ending 2005				Yes
	Audited account for year ending 2004				Yes
	Cumulative account				Yes
	Budget for 2007				
	Budget for 2006				
Working papers					
	Enhancing investment opportunities in sustainable forestry and conservation through carbon sequestration				
	How can Iwokrama help you adapt to climate change				
	Climate change: a new financial approach to standing forests	Glover Mitchell and Woods			Yes

Type	Title	Author	Date	Soft	Hard
IBOT and NRDDB					
	Letters of appointment for trustees				
	Biographical details				
	NRDDB comments on 2006-2010 business plan				
Job descriptions	Raquel Thomas, David Singh, Dane Gobin (2)				Yes
CV	Raquel Thomas, Graham Watkins				Yes
	Dane Tobin, David Singh, Ken Rodway, David Cassells				
Letters of appointment	Raquel Thomas, Kathryn Monk, Graham Watkins				Yes
Protocols					
	IIC Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual				
Legal					
	Fairview land title				Yes

ANNEX NINE. ANALYSIS OF COMSEC ASSISTANCE USING “PROJECT DOCUMENTS” (FMIS FIGURES)

PAF project purpose and outputs table

Code	Title	Date to	Budget	Goal	Project purpose	Output
PGIWO007	Site resources survey manager Ivan Anderson	1996	15,958		None	Fully operational GIS produced
PGIWO008	Research and development manager Dr Srivastava extension	1996	29729		None	Forest ranger training R+D programme
PGIWO009	Resource economist Mr David Dunkley Commercialization of Biodiversity Assets	1997	36274	Iwokrama develops the capacity to develop viable businesses	None	Links with local communities Baseline studies for tourism
PGIWO010	Cap Bldg for Mgt/Admin of Iwokrama (CSAP) NTFP product specialist	1998	90316			Plans for the development of NTFPs produced
PGIWO011	Project design consultant	1997	9213		None	Project design assisted
PGIWO012	Director General (David Cassells)	1999	17020		None	DG duration of employment extended
PGIWO013	Forest manager	2003	166373		Forest linked activities supervised and monitored	Forest related plans produced by a forest manager

PGIWO014	Director General (Katherine Monk)	2003	115304	Conservation and the sustainable and equitable use of tropical rain forest ecosystems	Innovative and cost effective programme and business environment maintained	DG ToR duties fulfilled
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Code	Title	Date to	Budget	Goal	Project purpose	Output
PGIWO015	Forest Manager (Ken Rodway)	2007	165849	Environmentally sustainable development	Sustainable business development to fund the core costs of Iwokrama and poverty alleviation of local communities	Models of rainforest management Models of harvesting Staff trained in log scaling, volume measurement and logging techniques
PBCWG148	Commercialisation of biodiversity assets	2006	94977		Capacity built to run business	Tourism business developed Training business developed
PGGUYO01V	Capacity building for management	2007	16439 Note: Volunteers from the commonwealth service abroad programme were used	Sustainable management of a pristine rainforest complex	Iwokrama centre transformed from inward looking research centre to a results based community impacting organisation	Projects implemented Staff work plans produced Quarterly reports produced

Code	Title	Date to	Budget	Goal	Project purpose	Output
PGIWO016	Director General- David Singh	2007	52990	Environmentally sustainable development	Centre managed as guided by the IBOT	Income increased
PGIWO017	Institutional strengthening	2006	191071		IIC effectively managed	Business plan produced
PGIWO018	Institutional Strengthening- IWOKRAMA David Singh, Dane Gobin and Dr Raquel Thomas?	2007	111741	Environmentally sustainable development	Administrative support for centre provided	Centre sustained until December 2007
COMSEC TRAVEL ETC Total			256747 1,370,001			

New PAFS

PBCWG125	Development of Iwokrama Business plan and first stage implementation	2003	46100	Business plan	IBOT and donor meeting held to enable a business approach	5 year business and workplan produced Restructuring achieved Staff trained in business culture Proposals for short term funding submitted Trust fund set up New Board members join
PCWG172	ComSec support for governance	2005	10000	Best models	Long term governance and funding secured	Policies formulated by IBOT Funds raised for long term activities Integration of indigenous communities in the sustainable conservation and utilisation of the rainforest